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Introduction
When corporations file for bankruptcy, they choose whether to
enter Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. Under Chapter 7, the firm is
liquidated: its assets are sold off, and the proceeds are distributed to
creditors roughly in order of priority. Under Chapter 11, the firm is
reorganized, which means that some or all of the existing creditors
and equityholders yield their contractual rights to receive transfers
from the firm, and receive new and usually less valuable rights in the
new entity. The two chapters serve the same bankruptcy purpose of
maximizing the payments to interest holders while respecting
contractual entitlements as much as possible. The difference is that
Chapter 7 is intended to prevail when the firm is worth more in
pieces than as a going concern, and Chapter 11 is intended to prevail
when the firm is worth more as a going concern.
Despite these similarities, the procedures under Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 are quite different. In Chapter 7, a disinterested trustee
takes control of the firm, marshals its assets, sells them, and
distributes the proceeds. When a firm files under Chapter 11, its
managers have the exclusive right to propose a plan of
reorganization, which gives creditors cash, assets, or rights to
payment streams from the reorganized firm. Creditors and other
interested parties have no right to propose an alternative plan. The
exclusivity period terminates after 120 days but the deadline is
routinely extended by bankruptcy courts. When the exclusivity
period ends, plans may be proposed both by the debtor and by any
creditor. A reorganization plan generally divides creditors into
classes, usually on the basis of the similarity of their claims, and must
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give everyone in a class the same rights. Each class votes on the plan,
and is deemed to accept the plan if a majority of the members of the
class votes for the plan, and members whose claims aggregate to at
least 2/3 of all claims vote for the plan. If every class votes in favor of
the plan, a court will generally confirm the plan. If a class does not
vote in favor of the plan, the plan may be confirmed over its
objection, but only if the creditors in the class are paid off in full or
no class of junior priority receives any value under the plan. In
addition, such a plan may be confirmed only if there is at least one
impaired class that votes in favor of the plan, and if every
nonconsenting creditor does as well as it would if the firm were
liquidated under Chapter 7.
Chapter 11’s rules are idiosyncratic—they bear only passing
relation to the insolvency procedures used in other countries1—and
difficult to understand. Yet the literature on these rules is sparse. A
few scholars have looked at elements of the system, but no one has
tried to understand how all the voting rules fit together. The most
relevant papers are by Baird and Picker2 and Bebchuk and Chang,3
which model bargaining between the debtor (or its manager) and a
single creditor under perfect information, and focus on the
exclusivity period. Although these papers illuminate small corners of
the Chapter 11 system, they do not shed light on the system as a
whole. The reasons for this are that Chapter 11 is essentially about
distributing value among many interests, not just two; that
information problems are pervasive in bankruptcy; and that all of the
voting rules work together, so that a focus on one or two is
misleading.
                                          
1 See, e.g., Patrick Ziechmann & Arthur D. Little, Business Bankruptcy in
Germany, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 24 (1997) (classification, claim and
creditor-based voting, debtor/trustee agenda control in the new German
insolvency act) and Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach
to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies,
35 HARV. INTERN’L L.J. 267, 321 (1994) (classification, claim and creditor-based
voting, debtor agenda control in Canadian reorganizations).
2 Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J.L. STUD. 311 (1991).
3 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value
in Corporate Reorganizations, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253 (1992).
3 A Positive Theory of Chapter 11
This Article is the first comprehensive analysis of the voting rules
in Chapter 11. It differs from the prior literature in three ways. First,
we expand existing models to consider bargaining with multiple
creditors. Second, we pay more attention to imperfect information.
Third, we analyze all the voting rules in Chapter 11, not just two or
three.
Our inquiry is important for several reasons. The current system
has been in place for twenty years and, despite much dissatisfaction,
has so far been resistant to reform. Although some have concluded
from the stability of Chapter 11 that it is likely efficient,4 several
scholars have argued influentially that it should be replaced with a
system that avoids voting and relies instead on a more market-driven
valuation of the bankrupt firm, such as an auction system.5 But
before one endorses such a reform, one must be sure that one
understands how the existing system operates. Auctions and similar
mechanisms have their own costs,6 and these costs must be compared
with the costs of a voting system. In addition, the voting system may
have benefits that auctions lack: for example, it might induce
creditors to reveal information about the firm’s value even in the
presence of imperfect capital markets.
This Article sheds light on these questions by analyzing the
operation of the voting rules in Chapter 11. These voting rules can
be characterized in the following stylized way. (1) Debtor’s
exclusivity period; (2) distribution floors (the chapter 7 liquidation
value); (3) the absolute priority rule (higher priority creditors are paid
before other creditors); (4) bicameralism (referring to the coexistence
                                          
4 Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411
(1990) (concluding that corporate bankruptcy offers little in the way of transfers to
interest groups, and hence efficiency must explain its durability).
5 Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.L. STUD.
127 (1986). Bebchuk has argued that Chapter 11 should be replaced by a system in
which the creditors are granted options to buy shares of the reorganized debtor.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775 (1988). Creditors who exercise their options would need to pay higher-
priority creditors in full; if no options are exercised the secured creditors receive
the equity in the reorganized firm.
6 E.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 320-21 (1993); Easterbrook, supra note __, at
415.
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of two voting schemes: creditor-based voting and claim-based
voting), and majority and supermajority rule; (5) classification and
equal treatment. Part I describes the conceptual framework that is
used to analyze these rules, and Parts II-V provide the analysis of
each rule. Throughout, we assume that managers act in the interest
of shareholders and that creditors cannot buy and sell claims. Part VI
relaxes these assumptions. A brief conclusion discusses the
implications of the analysis for reform of Chapter 11.
I. Modeling Chapter 11 Proceedings
A. The Purpose of Chapter 11
We assume that the purpose of Chapter 11 is to minimize the
cost of credit.7 We put aside arguments that Chapter 11 has broader
functions, such as to redistribute wealth or provide a safety net.8 For
now, we focus on whether the specific voting rules of Chapter 11 can
plausibly be said to minimize the cost of credit.9
In a typical credit contract, the creditor receives payments of
principal and interest as long as the debtor is solvent, and obtains a
claim against the debtor’s assets if the debtor defaults. The interest
rate must compensate the creditor, in the aggregate, for its expected
losses from default. This means that the interest rate increases as the
probability of default increases, as the assets available to the creditor
                                          
7 This means to minimize interest rates, consistent with allocational efficiency. If,
for example, certain risks or costs can be borne more cheaply by creditors than by
debtors, those costs should be assigned to creditors even though that will result in
a somewhat higher interest rate.
8 Compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHIC. L. REV. 775 (1987)
with Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHIC. L. REV. 815 (1987) and Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory
Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1812-14 (1998).
9 There may be public choice reasons for thinking that the rules are efficient or
not. On the one hand, creditors as a group gain nothing from inefficient rules that
favor them over debtors, since they must pass these gains back to debtors in the
form of lower interest rates. On the other hand, certain kinds of creditors, and
other parties, such as attorneys, might gain from inefficient rules. See Eric A.
Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 47, 111-12 (1997) (discussing lawyers’ lobbying in favor of fee-generating
reorganization rules).
5 A Positive Theory of Chapter 11
upon default decline in value, and as the cost of collection increases.
The standard justification for a bankruptcy system is that it
maximizes the value of the debtor’s assets in case of default. In the
absence of a bankruptcy system, creditors would exercise their state
court remedies individually, and this would result in the debtor being
liquidated in piecemeal fashion although sometimes value would be
maximized if the debtor’s assets were sold together or the debtor
were reorganized.10 The last point is our concern. If the liquidation
value exceeds the going concern value, the firm should be liquidated;
otherwise the firm should be reorganized. The optimal system of
corporate reorganization captures the going concern surplus, if any,
and distributes the firm’s value to the creditors in the form of money
or securities (without at the same time increasing the probability of
bankruptcy or causing other ex ante distortions11).
How might a system of reorganization maximize the going
concern surplus? It must ensure that information is aggregated
properly. The debtor, the creditors, and independent parties like
examiners and trustees will generally have incomplete and only partly
overlapping information about the value of the firm. If they can be
forced to reveal their information, the latter can be used to
determine whether the firm should be liquidated or reorganized, and
if reorganized, how. However, information aggregation is costly: it is
costly both to analyze a firm’s finances and to endure delay while
information is gathered and disclosed. So the optimal system of
                                          
10 Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1982).
11 We will for the most part ignore the problem of prebankruptcy incentives,
including equity’s incentive to fail to maximize the value of the firm in anticipation
of bankruptcy, see Jeremey I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9
BELL J. ECON. 437 (1978). It is sufficient to note that because the voting rules
give the debtor a return in bankruptcy even if a risky project results in bankruptcy,
and the debtor enjoys the upside of any risky project, the debtor has an incentive to
overinvest in risky projects in anticipation of bankruptcy (the “overinvestment”
problem). Creditors faced with this overinvestment risk might demand high
interest rates that would drive out even positive net present value projects.
Schwartz, supra note __. The optimal bankruptcy law thus might balance the goal
of maximizing going concern value subject to prebankruptcy entitlements, with the
goal of ensuring desirable near bankruptcy incentives, but we will not address this
complication.
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corporate reorganization balances the gain from information
aggregation against the cost. The total payout to all parties should be
maximized, and this is done by choosing an optimal capital structure
as expeditiously as possible. When we refer to the goal of
“maximizing going concern surplus,” we mean to include the time
value as well as the absolute value.
Bankruptcy law should not merely maximize going concern
surplus. If the law maximized the going concern value of firms but
gave the entire value to the debtor, then creditors would anticipate
receiving no value in bankruptcy and charge very high interest rates.
Thus, bankruptcy law must also respect credit contracts, which
establish “prebankruptcy entitlements.” Although there is some
controversy over this issue,12 we assume that creditors and debtors
should have the power to determine in their prebankruptcy credit
contracts the creditors’ rights in bankruptcy. Creditors and debtors
sometimes prefer low-risk credit, which gives the creditor high
priority in bankruptcy and the debtor a low interest rate, and they
sometimes prefer high-risk credit, which gives the creditor low
priority in bankruptcy and the debtor a high interest rate. These
arrangements are obtained through security agreements, debt
covenants, and other contracts. Respecting these arrangements will
be referred to as “respecting prebankruptcy entitlements.”
The two goals of bankruptcy law—maximizing firm value ex post
and respecting prebankruptcy entitlements—are often in tension. On
the one hand, the law could easily maximize firm value ex post by
giving all value to the debtor, but then because the creditors would
anticipate no value, they would charge high interest rates and the
cost of credit would not be minimized. On the other hand, if the law
fully respected prebankruptcy entitlements, it may be impossible to
create the proper incentives to maximize firm value. In addition,
because many postbankruptcy events are non-contractible,
prebankruptcy arrangements will be incomplete and will fail to
provide for optimal ex ante incentives. For example, the firm’s
liquidation value might be 100, and its going-concern value only 95,
                                          
12 Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436
(1997); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1051 (1984); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse N. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
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but trade creditors might receive a return of 10 if the firm is
reorganized rather than liquidated, or workers might avoid 10 in
dislocation costs, whereas banks with identical prebankruptcy claims
would not receive these postbankruptcy returns. If the trade
creditors’ or workers’ interests cannot be contracted about ex ante, a
bankruptcy law that failed to recognize them would result in
inefficient plans. The dual goals of maximizing the firm’s value and
respecting prebankruptcy entitlements could be attained if the firm is
reorganized but creditors without a postbankruptcy interest do at
least as well as they would in liquidation.
How does Chapter 11 resolve the tension between maximizing
firm value ex post and respecting prebankruptcy entitlements, if
indeed it does? The next sections address this question.
B. Modeling Chapter 11 Bargaining
To analyze bargaining in Chapter 11, one must distinguish the
goal of information aggregation and the problem of opportunistic
behavior. If parties always acted sincerely, then the optimal Chapter
11 would simply be the solution to the problem of how to gather
information from the parties and aggregate this information in the
proper way. Because parties do not act sincerely, however, one must
analyze how reorganization rules affect parties’ incentives to engage
in strategic behavior. This task requires two more distinctions. First,
we distinguish between two-party bargaining and multi-party
bargaining. Second, we distinguish between bargaining under perfect
information and bargaining under imperfect information. These
distinctions produce four models: two-party bargaining with and
without perfect information, and multi-party bargaining with and
without perfect information. Each model highlights aspects of the
bankruptcy bargaining problem, and these aspects will be
summarized at the conclusion of the discussion.
1. Sincere Voting and Information Pooling
If bankruptcy courts had perfect information, they could impose
a plan that both maximized going concern value and paid creditors
in a manner that respected prebankruptcy entitlements. Therefore,
voting rules would be unnecessary. The existence of voting rules
assumes that the judge has imperfect information and that creditors
collectively have better information. But Chapter 11 does not assume
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that the judge has no information. It combines creditor voting and
judicial oversight. The judge must have enough information to
determine the liquidation value of the firm and, of course, to
administer the voting rules, which requires, among other things, the
capacity to verify the identity of claimants and the value of claims.
Accordingly, we initially assume that the court has such information,
but in later sections we will modify these assumptions and address
the problem of judicial error.
Why might voting rules make sense from the perspective of
information aggregation? Suppose that a single plan is proposed, and
creditors vote either for the plan or for liquidation. Assume that
every creditor has an equal probability of voting correctly, and that
probability is greater than 0.5. The latter assumption seems
reasonable: a completely uninformed creditor who flipped a coin
would vote correctly with a probability of 0.5; so if a creditor has any
information, its probability will exceed 0.5. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem shows that if probabilities are independent (that is, all
creditors are not mislead in the same way) then as the number of
creditors increases, the probability of the correct decision being made
increases rapidly, and approaches 100%.13 The significance of this
result is that even if each creditor has relatively little information,
and is barely better than a flip of the coin, a large enough group can
make quite a good estimate. This result can be extended
straightforwardly to cases where p varies among creditors. If some
creditors are more competent than others, then the group will be
more competent than the average creditor, and in some cases will be
more competent than the most competent creditor.14
                                          
13 Let p represent the probability that a creditor votes correctly, with 0 £  p £  1, and
let q=1-p. There are n creditors. We assume that n is an odd number for
expository clarity; nothing turns on this assumption. Let x=(n+1)/2. If Pn is the
probability that a majority of the creditors vote correctly, then
n n
Pn = S x x p
xqn-x.
For example, if p=0.6, and n=15, Pn=0.7854. See Nicholas R. Miller, Information,
Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, in BERNARD GROFMAN & GUILLERMO OWEN, INFORMATION
POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 175-77 (1986).
14 See id.
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The Condorcet Jury Theorem presents the best argument for
voting in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Suppose that instead a judge
decided by himself whether to reorganize or liquidate a firm. It is
highly unlikely that the judge has better competence than the
average creditor, and even more unlikely that the judge has better
competence than the most competent creditor. If creditors vote
honestly, then they are much more likely as a group to vote correctly
than is a single judge. Similarly, if creditors submitted sealed bids in
an auction, it is less likely that the firm would be correctly liquidated
or reorganized than if sincere voting occurs.15
If creditors have different competences, then the optimal voting
system will give more weight to creditors with greater competence.16
If competence increases with the value of a claim, larger creditors
should have disproportionate voting power in reorganization
proceedings. A small creditor that knows nothing about the firm
(p=0.5) should have no voting power (weighting equals 0), while a
large bank with intimate knowledge about the firm (p approaches 1),
should have a great deal of voting power. Similarly, if the debtor has
a great deal of private information about the optimal reorganization,
it should have disproportionate voting power.
2. Strategic Voting with Two Parties and Perfect Information
The previous section assumes that the parties do not act
strategically. If a creditor believes that a firm is worth more as going
concern than as a pile of assets, it votes in favor of reorganization,
even if it would receive a higher payout under Chapter 7 than under
Chapter 11. But such behavior is not rational. Henceforth, we
assume that the parties act strategically. We describe four models of
strategic behavior in Chapter 11. In these models we assume that the
parties have perfect information with respect to the optimal
reorganization of the firm, and discuss bargaining among two or
more parties, and bargaining when parties have perfect or imperfect
                                          
15 However, auctions can be designed to enable pooling of information. For
example, if each creditor bids after observing a bid by another creditor, some
information pooling will occur. See Donald Wittman, Information Pooling in
Auctions, in GROFMAN & OWEN, supra note __.
16 See Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen, Review Essay: Condorcet Models and
Avenues for Future Research, in GROFMAN & OWEN, supra, note __, at 95.
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information with respect to other parties’ valuations of the
reorganized firm. We start with a model of bargaining between two
parties with perfect information about each other’s valuations.
The players are equity (E) and creditor (H), one creditor or
(more helpfully) a hypothetical representative of multiple creditors.
Bargaining occurs over T rounds; the firm is liquidated in round T if
E and H have not reached agreement on a reorganization plan. H
has a claim, c, against E. In each round E can either propose a plan
that offers p(t), or decline to make an offer. If E makes an offer, H
can accept the offer or reject the offer. If H rejects the offer in round
t, E then has the choice to make an offer or not in round t+1. The
liquidation value, v, and the going concern value, s, remain
constant.17 For convenience, s ‡  v; if s=v, the firm has no going
concern surplus. We assume c>s. Parties have equal discount factors,
d, per round.18 Parties have complete and perfect information, and
common knowledge is assumed.
To solve the game, we use backward induction. Consider the
parties’ expectations at round T-1. If H rejects E’s offer, H will
receive v in round T, which is worth dv in round T-1. To prevent H
from rejecting the offer, E must make a penultimate-round offer of
                                          
17 We make this assumption for expository simplicity; realistically, s declines
steadily during the bankruptcy because of the costs of reorganization, although it
might also fluctuate up or down as a result of market changes. One could model
these influences formally, see Bebchuk & Chang, supra note __, at 265-66;
however, for simplicity we exclude these influences. As we discuss below, they do
not change our qualitative results. For now, one might imagine that the firm
remains viable as a going concern until t=T, when the judge converts the case to a
Chapter 7 liquidation because the parties have failed to reach agreement in a
reasonable time.
18 Because s remains constant until t=T, a reorganization that occurs at round 0
does not technically generate greater going concern value than a reorganization
that occurs at round 1. In both cases, going concern value is s. However, as noted
above, what we care about is payout, not going concern value, and payout is a
function both of going concern value and of time value. So a reorganization in
round 0 produces a larger payout than a reorganization in round 1, a fact
represented by discount factors. Alternatively, d can be interpreted as a decay value
of s, so that dTs represents the going concern value of the firm at round t. But this
interpretation would not allow us to assign different discount factors to different
creditors, as we do later in this analysis, so we will not use it. Our assumption of a
common d can be understood as assuming well-functioning capital markets, an
assumption we relax subsequently.
1 1 A Positive Theory of Chapter 11
an amount p(T-1), p(T-1)‡ dv. To avoid excess notation, we assume
that H will accept an offer if the payoff from acceptance is no less
than the payoff from rejection. Thus, to maximize its own payoff, E
offers p(T-1)=dv. E retains for itself s-dv. At round T-2, if H rejects
E’s offer, H will receive d2v. So E offers p(T-2)=d2v, retaining for
itself s-d2v. At round T-3, E offers and H accepts the amount, d3v.
Continuing in this vein, H will demand (in round 0) and receive
p(0)=dTv. E retains s-dTv, the going concern value minus the
discounted liquidation value.19 So payoffs are {s-dTv, dTv} for {E, H}.
There are two main points of interest. First, going concern value
is maximized because agreement always occurs on the first round.20
Second, prebankruptcy entitlements are violated. There is an
important connection between these two outcomes. Going concern
value is maximized precisely because E is allowed to violate
prebankruptcy entitlements. If E were not allowed to retain any
value for itself, it would not expend any effort to propose the plan
(since c>s, by assumption). The violation of prebankruptcy
entitlements is substantial. E obtains not only the going concern
surplus (s-v), but a portion of the undiscounted liquidation value as
well (v(1-dT)).21 Notice that H’s payoff is independent of c.
Some complications should be noted. First, the exclusivity
period, e, may lapse before bargaining ends. In our model, we
assumed that e=T. This assumption is reasonable under certain
circumstances. It means that (i) the parties discount the future
                                          
19 This is the basic Rubinstein bargaining model with perfect information, which is
also used by Baird & Picker, supra note __,and Bebchuk & Chang, supra note __.
Baird and Picker, however, use an alternating offer version of the model, on which
see below.
20 As noted earlier, “maximization of going concern value” in this context refers
both to the fact that s is captured (when it would not if agreement fails and the
firm is liquidated at t=T) and that agreement occurs in round 0 rather than a later
round, given that parties discount future payoffs.
21 One might argue that the court would reject such a plan, because it gives the
creditor in round 0 the discounted liquidation value, rather than actual liquidation
value, as required by the Code. However, the Code also provides that the court
should not enforce the liquidation floor if there is unanimous consent to a plan.
Ironically, the creditor’s power to waive its right to actual liquidation value injures
its interests when the debtor has all the bargaining power. We discuss these issues
in greater detail in Part III.
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heavily, (ii) going concern value declines rapidly, or (iii) the creditors
do not expect to be able to confirm their own plan post-exclusivity
(on which see below)—so that, on average, bargaining would not
continue beyond round e if the parties could not agree in earlier
rounds. However, under plausible conditions, e<T, which means that
after round e, H is entitled to make a counteroffer. A model of
alternating offers at t>e implies that H and E would divide the
surplus that is saved by agreeing at e rather than T.22
The analysis is difficult because it is not clear how much the
existence of cram down, which is monitored by the judge, affects
relative bargaining power. However, we can identify the two extreme
results which bracket the range of possible outcomes. First, suppose
that at any time after the exclusivity period H can cram down a plan
that pays it before E. At round e, E will have to offer s (assuming for
simplicity that c>s) and H will accept. Thus, in the first round E will
offer des. E retains s-des. Notice that if e=T, then E will offer dTv (as
in the basic model), because at time T, H can obtain only v, not s.
Second, suppose that H has no cram down power. At round e,
the going concern value is s, and the discounted liquidation value at
time T is dT-ev. If E and H have identical discount factors, then E
will offer about (1/2)(s+dT-ev)23 at round e, and H will accept rather
than reject and make a counteroffer. Thus, in the first round E will
offer de(1/2)(s+dT-ev) and H will accept. E retains s-de(1/2)(s+dT-ev).
Since cram down is not always practicable,24 the analysis gives us
                                          
22 See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note __, at 267.
23 I.e., H and E split the surplus (s-dT-ev) available at round e, and H still receives
the present value of v in round e (dT-ev), so H receives 1/2(s-dT-ev)+dT-ev.
Technically, the split in the surplus would not be 1/2, but rather the party who
made the first offer would offer the other party d/(1+d). ROBERT GIBBONS,
GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 68-71 (1992). That is, if the
discount factor is .95, the offer will be to give the other party .95/1.95 = 48.7% of
the savings. The offeree would accept this, since he cannot make a counter-offer
that will be accepted and that gives him more. However, if, by assumption, E and
H are equally likely to make the first offer, 1/2 the time they would receive 48.7%
and 1/2 the time 51.3%, which averages out to an equal division of the surplus.
24 The reason for this ambiguity is that cram down requires judicial confirmation
and the court may make errors. For example, if the court incorrectly believes that
c<s, it will erroneously refuse to confirm a cram down, depriving H of cram down
power that it ought to have.
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a range of possible divisions of value. H receives [de(1/2)(s+dT-ev),
des]; E receives [s-de(1/2)(s+dT-ev), (1-de)s]. Note that E always
obtains a portion of the going concern surplus, an advantage
attributable to its agenda control during the exclusivity period. H
might receive a portion of the going concern surplus. For example,
with cram down H receives des, which could be, though is not
necessarily, greater than v.
Second, the value of s and v can vary. On average, s might
decline because a firm’s resources are diverted to expenses associated
with the reorganization process and because during reorganization
managers might have poor incentives to maximize the value of the
firm. This, however, does not affect our analysis when e=T, because
E always gives H slightly more than discounted liquidation value,
which H will always accept, and s plays no role in the bargaining.
When e<T, H expects des when it has the cram down power, in
which case the possibility that s will decline reduces the amount that
H will accept in the first round. The value, s, may also fluctuate with
exogenous changes in the market. Again, this does not affect our
analysis when e=T, because H will never accept less than its
discounted liquidation value. When e<T, the possibility of
fluctuation benefits E, because a sharp spike upward (after round e)
can result in H being paid off in full and E receiving the entire
residual (we assume no cram down power here), whereas a sharp
decline is shared. The asymmetry gives E an option value from
delay.25 In addition, v might decline (or increase) for either of these
reasons, but further discussion of these complications would take us
too far afield.
Neither complication alters the qualitative conclusions of the
basic model. Agreement occurs immediately, so delay costs are
avoided and going concern value is maximized; and the debtor
obtains more value than it would if prebankruptcy entitlements were
respected.
3. Strategic Voting with Two Parties and Imperfect Information
E, H, or both parties might have private information. E might
have private information about its liquidation or going concern
value, because its managers specialize in understanding the firm and
                                          
25 See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note __, at 264.
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its market sector. H might have private information about its
valuation of a reorganized firm, which we call its “postbankruptcy
interest.” For example, trade creditors or employees might obtain
value from dealing with a reorganized version of the debtor, which
cannot occur if the debtor is sold off in pieces. And both E and H
might have private information about their discount factors (if
imperfections in the capital market prevent them from engaging in
optimal borrowing, such that discount rates vary).
For the moment, assume that only E has private information
about its value, El or Eh, and that each firm, Ei, has liquidation value
vi and going concern value si.26 A firm has low value with a
probability of ql and high value with a probability of qh. Because of
the exclusivity period, Ei has the power to make an offer immediately
or to delay before making an offer. It might choose to delay in order
to signal that its value is low. The game continues for e=T rounds,
and then ends with the liquidation of Ei if an offer has not been
accepted. Ei’s payoff is its going concern value (si), high or low,
minus the value of the offer accepted at round t, discounted to
present value: dt(si - p(t)). H’s payoff is d
t(p(t)).
Two kinds of equilibrium can result: separating or pooling. In a
separating equilibrium, Eh offers d
T(vh) in round 0; El delays and
offers dT-t(vl) in round t; H accepts either offer; and H believes that a
first-round offer of dT(vh) can only be from Eh, and that an offer
following a delay can only be from El. Thus, if the firm is high value
H receives dTvh and E retains sh-d
Tvh. If the firm is low value H
receives dt(dT-tvl) (which equals d
Tvl) and E retains d
t(sl-d
T-tvl). The
explanation for this result is that delay can signal that the firm is
low-value, because a high-value firm loses more from delay than a
low-value firm does. Note first that Eh must make a first-round offer
greater than or equal to H’s discounted liquidation value, dT(vh), in
order to deter H from rejecting the offer, assuming H believes first-
round offerors are high-value. If H believes that anyone who delays
is low value, H will accept an offer delayed to round t so long as it
                                          
26 This model is a slightly modified version of John Kennan & Robert Wilson,
Bargaining With Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 63 (1993) (discussing
screening, rather than signaling, and making some other assumptions); Anat R.
Admati & Motty Perry, Strategic Delay in Bargaining, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 345,
360 (1987).
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equals dT-t(vl), by similar reasoning. To understand why H would
have these beliefs, note that H must consider the possibility that Eh
would mimic El and delay before making an offer. If both types
delayed until round t, then H would accept only if the offer equaled
the expected liquidation value, which is dT-tvo, where vo=qhvh+qlvl.
Thus, Eh’s expected payoff from pooling would be d
t(sh-vo).
Therefore, the separating equilibrium can be sustained only if: sh-
dTvh > d
t(sh-vo), for all 0<t<T, that is, if Eh maximizes its share by
revealing itself in the first round to be a high-value firm. Finally, El
prefers to delay until round t, if dt(sl-d
T-tvl) > sl-d
Tvh.27 These
conditions are met, as long as there is a sufficient difference between
vh and vl  and between sh and sl, qi is not too small or large, the
relevant bargaining period (T) is sufficiently long, and discounting is
not too high or low.
Otherwise, pooling will occur. With pooling, Ei would make a
first-round offer of dTvo, and H would accept it. E retains s-d
Tvo.
The model shows that if El has private information about its
liquidation value, it may delay in order to signal that it has a low
valuation. Eh and H agree in the first round, with Eh obtaining the
entire going concern surplus plus a portion of the initial liquidation
value (just as in the perfect information model), and going concern
value is not lost. But El and H do not agree until round t, with the
result that some going concern value is lost. The average cost of
delay is ql(sl-d
tsl). Note that this loss is borne entirely by E, which
receives dtsl-d
Tvl rather than the sl-d
Tvl it would receive if there were
no private information and agreement occurred in the first round. H
receives dTvl in either case. If there is no spread between vh and vl, or
(formally the same) qh is 0 or 1, there is no private information, and
parties agree immediately as in the perfect information model. It
would be more realistic to assume that Ei cannot engage in obvious
delay, since that might provoke a court to end the exclusivity period
or appoint a trustee. But the same result would obtain if one
                                          
27 This equilibrium might seem plausible only if d t(sl-d
T-tvl) > sl-d
Tvo. If it is not,
then both types of E do better in the pooling equilibrium, where they make a first
round offer of dTvo and H accepts. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 255, 307 (1994). Still, given a separating equilibrium for
which this inequality is not true, no debtor will be the first to deviate. They face a
collective action problem, because each would be better off only if both deviate.
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assumed that El made very low offers in early rounds, which H
rejected in the expectation of obtaining a higher offer in a later
round, high enough to offset discounting. (The low offers in early
rounds cannot be high enough for H to accept, because then Eh
would mimic.)
The model also shows that prebankruptcy entitlements are
violated even under the assumption of imperfect information. To be
sure, E absorbs the cost of delay, ql(sl-d 
tsl), and in this sense violation
of prebankruptcy entitlements are slightly less extreme than in the
first model, holding all else equal. But it remains the case that E is
likely to obtain substantial value, even when c>s.
Some complications should be noted. As in the perfect
information model, assuming a limited exclusivity period and an
option value for delay does not change the basic conclusions. Nor
would the more realistic assumption that E can make an offer along
a continuum. Nor (we think) would the more realistic assumption
that E’s type lies along a continuum rather than taking one of two
discrete values. In this situation we would have multiple equilibria,
but the qualitative conclusion (a likelihood of delay) would remain
unchanged. Finally, the conclusions would not change if we assumed
that E’s private information concerned its discount factor or other
relevant parameters rather than the firm’s liquidation value.
It should also be mentioned that H, rather than (or in addition
to) E, might have private information. H might have private
information about its discount factor if capital markets are poor, as
might be the case if H consists of employees, warranty holders, and
other small creditors. H might also have private information about
returns it might realize from a reorganized debtor. If H consists of
trade creditors, for example, they may prefer reorganization because
they expect future business with the reorganized entity. Call H a
high value creditor if it either has an interest in the reorganized
entity or a low discount factor. In a model in which only H has
private information and E moves first, delay will occur due to
screening rather than signaling. E will initially offer an ungenerous
plan that only the high value H accepts, and if rejected will delay and
then offer a more generous plan that the low value H accepts. If both
E and H have private information, Eh will make an immediate offer
and Hh will accept immediately; El will delay and Hh will accept
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immediately after the delayed offer; Eh will make an immediate offer
and Hl will delay before accepting; and El will delay, and then Hl will
delay further.28
Finally, note that (with e=T) signaling is possible only because
prebankruptcy entitlements are respected in liquidation at round T.
If H were not entitled to a share of the liquidation value of the firm,
H would have to accept 0 (or e ) from either type of E at round T-1,
and hence on the first round. This means that E retains its entire
going concern value, regardless of its type. But if both types of E
retain their entire going concern surplus, the low type gains nothing
by delaying before making an offer to H. Instead, the low type would
simply lose the time value of its going concern surplus between
rounds 0 and t. Hence, the low type would not delay, a separating
equilibrium is impossible, and going concern value would be
maximized. This is another example of our claim about the tension
between maximizing going concern value and respecting
prebankruptcy entitlements.
4. Strategic Voting with More Than Two Voters and Perfect
Information
The assumption that E bargains with a single hypothetical
creditor is quite unrealistic. Debtors rarely have only one creditor
and creditor interests are not perfectly aligned. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to model bargaining among more than two parties, and we
have found no such models that can be straightforwardly applied to
Chapter 11. The following passages describe somewhat
impressionistically how the results of the first two models might
change if the assumption of a single creditor is relaxed.
One might begin by assuming that E faces two creditors, C1 and
C2 with claims c1 and c2. Let a 1= c1/(c1+c2) and a 2=c2/(c1 +c2), so that
a 1+a 2 =1. (For n creditors, S
n
i=1a i=1.) In round t, E makes an offer,
and the two creditors simultaneously vote yes or no. If either creditor
votes no, we move to round t+1; in round e=T the debtor is
liquidated and each creditor receives its pro rata share, a i of the
liquidation value, v. The round T liquidation payoffs to (E, C1, C2)
are (0, a 1v, a 2v). In round T-1, E would propose (s-dv, da lv, d a 2v).
Continuing in this vein, E would propose (s-dTv, dTa 1v, d
T
a 2v) in
                                          
28 See Kennan & Wilson, supra note __, at 65-66, 79-80 (“attrition” model).
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the first round, and the creditors would accept. Notice that our
qualitative results do not change: delay is avoided so going concern
value is maximized, and prebankruptcy entitlements are violated.29
An advantage of relaxing the assumption of a single hypothetical
creditor is that it allows us to consider the possibility that creditors
might have different interests. Suppose, for example, that C2 has a
postbankruptcy interest in reorganization, because it expects to have
valuable continuing business with the reorganized debtor; C1 does
not. Represent this by an amount, h. The round T liquidation
payoffs to (E, C1, C2) are (0, a 1v, a 2v-h). In the first round E would
propose (s-dTv, dTa 1v, d
T(a 2v-h)), and the creditors would accept.
Alternatively, if the creditors differ with respect to their discount
factors, payoffs will reflect this difference. E will propose and the








a 2v). Under both
alternatives, E’s agenda control enables it not only to obtain value in
violation of prebankruptcy entitlements (as in the other models), but
also to treat differently creditors with the same prebankruptcy
entitlements.
A more difficult and interesting problem arises when we assume
that e<T, so that each creditor acquires an opportunity to propose its
own plan at t>e. Suppose that at round e+1, the debtor and each
creditor has a 1/3 chance of proposing a plan. The non-proposers
must vote for the plan. If either votes against the plan, then the
debtor and each creditor again has a 1/3 chance of proposing a plan
at round e+2, and so on. The logic of the two-party alternating offers
model would seem to extend to this bargaining problem, so that
payoffs at round e are {1/3(s-dT-ev), 1/3(s-dT-ev)+ a 1d
T-ev, 1/3(s-dT-
ev)+ a 2d
T-ev}. At round 0, the payoffs are: {s-(2/3de(s-dT-ev)+dTv),
1/3de(s-dT-ev)+ a 1d
Tv, 1/3de(s-dT-ev)+ a 2d
Tv}. Notice that discounted
liquidation value is distributed in conformity with prebankruptcy
entitlements, whereas going concern surplus is distributed based on
the relative bargaining power created by the voting rules.30
                                          
29 Unfortunately, there are many other equilibria. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE &
ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990). We think that the
outcome in the text is most plausible in the aggregate, and we will use it
henceforth for the purpose of analysis.
30 This implies that a creditor Ci could receive more than ci. One might argue that
the judge would not allow this, so that a creditor’s payoff is truncated by the size of
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The debtor might not realistically have a chance to propose a
plan at round t>e: on the one hand, creditors formally have the right
to cram down a plan that gives nothing to the debtor; on the other
hand, the debtor might waste its own assets or take negative net
present value risks unless it expects to receive value from the
reorganization. In the first case, the debtor does not really have a 1/3
chance of proposing a plan, and thus would not receive a 1/3 share of
the round e surplus, s-dT-ev. Similarly, a small or unsophisticated or
uninterested creditor is unlikely to participate actively in bargaining
after round e, and thus would not expect its share of the round e
surplus; it would receive instead its share of the discounted
liquidation value, and the payout to the other potential bargainers
after round e would correspondingly increase.
An important difference between two-party and multi-party
models arises from the choice of voting rules. In a two-party model,
the voting rule is always implicitly unanimity: both parties must
consent to a plan. In a multi-party model, an alternative that must be
considered is majority rule. In fact, we will see that a unanimity rule
can present serious problems, and so a majority rule can be quite
attractive. But under majority rule, the analysis in the preceding
paragraph changes.
To see why, imagine bargaining after round e, and assume that 3
creditors bargain over a plan that will give the debtor 0. At round T,
all creditors receive their share of liquidation value. At round T-1>e,
one might assume that one creditor, C1, has the power to propose a
plan. C1 will give C2 and C3 their discounted liquidation value and
retain the surplus (s-dT-1(a 2+a 3)v) for itself. At round T-2, another
creditor, C2, has the power to propose a plan. Now C2 does not
know whether it, C1, or C3 will have agenda power at round T-1, so
it will offer C1 and C3 a third of what they would obtain at T-1 if
they had agenda control plus two thirds of what they would obtain if
they lacked agenda control. Thus, this model suggests that, at round
e-1, each of n creditors expects to receive, at round e, 1/n times the
                                                                                     
his claim. For example, C1's payoff is min{1/3d
e(s-dT-ev)+a 1d
Tv,  c1}. However,
since by assumption the judge does not know s, it is not clear how the judge could
prevent the overcompensation of creditors if payments under the plan are not in
the form of cash. To simplify exposition, we assume that 1/3de(s-dT-ev)+a id
Tv < ci,
except when otherwise noted.
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difference between s and dT-ev (plus its share of dT-ev). What the
debtor will offer the creditors at round 0 is a more complicated
matter, which we will discuss in later sections. The point for present
purposes is that a model of alternating offers produces an intuitive
result of equal sharing of the surplus over discounted liquidation
value.
The problem with this model of majority rule is that it imposes
more structure on post-exclusivity bargaining than seems to exist in
reality. To see why, suppose that at round e the debtor proposes a
plan that divides the remaining surplus between it, C1 and C2: (1/3
(s-dT-ev), 1/3(s-dT-ev)+a 1d
T-ev, 1/3(s-dT-ev)+a 2d
T-ev, a 3 d
T-ev). (We
assume that the assent of two of the three creditors is necessary for
plan confirmation.) In response, C3 might try to bribe C1 to depart
from the winning coalition and form a new coalition with C3. Such
a bribe might be: (0, s/2, 0, s/2). The debtor might counter by
proposing a new coalition to C1 and C2: (s/4, s/2+a , s/4- a , 0), where
a  is some small amount. Then C2 might respond with (0, 0, s/2,
s/2), and so on. In principle, cycling could occur indefinitely, while
in the meantime the going concern value is depleted. Indeed, the
parties might rationally invest in bargaining so as to deplete
discounted liquidation value as well. If the creditors anticipate costly
post-exclusivity bargaining, the debtor can reduce its offer in round 0
accordingly. We will discuss these possibilities in greater detail in
Part II.
For now, it is sufficient to point out that while both the non-
cycling result and the cycling result play an important role in
explaining Chapter 11’s voting rules, both models have defects and
the literature on these issues is not particularly helpful. Thus,
problems of multi-party bargaining must be approached with
circumspection.
5. Strategic Voting with More Than Two Creditors and Imperfect
Information
With multiple creditors and imperfect information, delay can
result for the same reason as in the E/H imperfect information
model. Again, the debtor may have private information about its
value, and low-value debtors will delay in order to signal their type.
If the creditors have private information then the low-value creditors
may engage in delay, by voting against E’s early offers, in order to
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signal that they have high discount factors and/or do not obtain non-
plan returns from reorganization. This problem is more serious than
in the two-party model, because any creditor with veto power
potentially has an incentive to cause delay. In the two-party model
when only the creditor (and not the debtor) has private information,
the probability of delay cannot be more than the probability that the
creditor has a low valuation, ql. (It can be less, because pooling can
occur.) Suppose that ql=0.2. In the two-party model, the probability
of delay cannot be more than 0.2. Now imagine that the debtor has
10 creditors. If the probability that any one creditor is low-value is
0.2, then the probability that at least one creditor will engage in
delay could be as high as .89. Whether the probability would actually
be that high in any given case depends on a variety of factors,
including the distribution of types, the order of play, and the values
of the other parameters. In addition, if—as in the attrition
model—creditors take turns delaying, then as the number of
creditors increases, so will the length of delay. But the overall
conclusion is again similar to E/H with imperfect information: pre-
bankruptcy entitlements are violated and going concern value may be
depleted through delay.
6. Summary
The Condorcet Jury Theorem implies that voting is a powerful
mechanism for information pooling, which is desirable because
information pooling enables maximization of the ex post value of the
firm. But the models of strategic voting show that parties can exploit
voting rules in order to violate prebankruptcy entitlements. The most
striking example is the exclusivity period, which is highly favorable
to the debtor.31 If the debtor’s bargaining power is reduced (for
                                          
31 Empirical studies of Chapter 11 consistently find violations of prebankruptcy
entitlements. E.g., Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
285, 291, 294 (1990) (violations in 29 of 35 Chapter 11 filings); Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 239 U. PENN. L. REV. 125, 142,
166, 676, tbls. III, IV(A) & IV(B) (1990) (violations common whether debtor
solvent or insolvent upon plan confirmation); Julian R. Franks & Walter N.
Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747,
753, 756-58, tbls. II & III (1989) (violations common in Chapter 11 and also
under precursor Ch. X).
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example, a reduction in the length of the exclusivity period), the
creditor obtains more value. But one cannot generalize from this to
the proposition that equalizing bargaining power increases the
respect for prebankruptcy entitlements. The creditor’s share of the
surplus is unrelated to the size of its claim. This is clear in the multi-
party model: creditors receive an amount in proportion to their
bargaining power (which is a function of discount factors and
postbankruptcy interests, as well as the voting system), so that
creditors with equal claims can receive different amounts and
creditors with different prebankruptcy entitlements can receive the
same amount. If one reduced the debtor’s bargaining power by
reducing the exclusivity period, creditors’ positions would improve by
an equal amount per creditor, without regard to the size of a
creditor’s claim.
In both perfect information models, going concern value is
maximized because delay cannot occur. By introducing imperfect
information, we see that parties will delay in order to signal their
type.32 Delay can occur only when parties share bargaining power.
When one party (such as the debtor) has all the bargaining power,
that party has no reason to delay the plan and the other party has no
power to delay the plan. If the only goal of bankruptcy law were to
maximize the payouts based on going concern value, we would want
to give all the bargaining power to one party. The reason that we do
not do this is that the party with all the bargaining power would not
respect prebankruptcy entitlements.
So there is a tension. On the one hand, respect for prebankruptcy
entitlements implies division of bargaining power in a manner that
reflects those entitlements. On the other hand, maximization of
going concern value implies concentration of bargaining power in
one party. We will see this tension—between exploitation costs and
bargaining costs—recur in our analysis of all the voting rules in
                                          
32 Empirical studies confirm that Chapter 11 proceedings can be lengthy. E.g.,
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, Part II, 57 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 247, 269 (1983) (median of
9.5 months and mean of 10.4 months to plan confirmation in sample containing
many small firms); Franks & Torous, supra note __, at 753 tbl. II (mean of 2.57
years among 15 large firms filing after Chapter 11's effective date of 10/1/79);
Weiss, supra note __, at 288 (mean of 2.5 years among sample of publicly-traded
firms).
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Chapter 11.
We will also see that one way to relieve this tension is to give a
prominent role to the court. If the court has good information, it can
enforce prebankruptcy entitlements without interfering with
reorganization. However, if it has bad information, its attempt to
enforce prebankruptcy entitlements will result in their violation, in
delay, and in a failure to maximize going concern value.
II. Exclusivity Period
Chapter 11 grants the debtor a 120 day period during which to
propose a reorganization plan and an additional 60 day period during
which to have its plan accepted.33 Only after the expiration of this
180 day period may creditors submit their own reorganization plans.
This “exclusivity period” may be lengthened or shortened “for
cause,”34 and the period ends prematurely if a trustee is appointed.35
The exclusivity period is routinely extended, especially in large,
complex cases.36
The Bankruptcy Code’s approach reflects a compromise between
the different approaches taken under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Chapter XI had given the debtor an unlimited exclusivity period;
Chapters X, while affording some primacy to the trustee if one were
appointed, allowed other parties to file competing plans.37
The debtor’s exclusivity period is one of the most controversial
voting rules. As the two-party perfect information model shows, the
                                          
33 11 U.S.C. §1121.
34 11 U.S.C. §1121(d).
35 11 U.S.C. §1121(c)(1).
36 3 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§11-13, 11-15 (1993).
37 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY para. 1121.02 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
rev. 1997). In Chapter X the trustee had an exclusivity period of sorts in which
only it could propose a plan, but before confirmation the debtor or creditors could
propose an alternate plan. Rule 10-301(c)(1) (superceded); reprinted in 13A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1977). See generally Kenneth A. Rosen &
Angel R. Rodriguez, Section 1121 and Non-Debtor Plans of Reorganization, 56 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 349 (1982). Chapter X was criticized for being time-consuming and
frequently unsuccessful. 124 Cong. Rec., Remarks of Congressman Don Edwards,
at 32405 (Sep. 28, 1978) (reporting on 991 chapter X filings, of which only 664
had been “terminated” and only 140 had resulted in the confirmation of a plan).
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right to control the agenda gives the debtor a great deal of
bargaining power. If e=T, the creditor will accept a plan that gives it
only the discounted value of the liquidation value at round T. As a
result, the debtor obtains not only the going concern surplus, but
also the difference between the round 0 liquidation value and the
discounted round T liquidation value. If e<T, the creditor may still
be forced to accept a plan that gives it less than actual liquidation
value at the time of bankruptcy, and no more than a discounted
portion of the going concern value at round e. These results are
substantial violations of prebankruptcy entitlements, according to
which (so long as c<s) a creditor should obtain the entire going
concern value of an insolvent debtor.
It might be argued that the creditor in the two-party model
would announce in round 0 that it would refuse to accept an offer
that did not give it some or all of the going concern value. Because
the debtor offers only discounted liquidation value, the creditor does
no worse by delaying. But if the debtor offered the creditor just
slightly more than discounted liquidation value, the creditor would
accept on the first round, because the debtor’s threat to the creditors
(dTv rather than the offered dTv + e ) would be credible, and the
creditors’ threat (to reject the debtor’s plan) would not be credible.
This is because once the debtor actually proposes a plan giving the
creditors discounted liquidation value, the debtor has committed not
to give the creditors more than that amount.38 The creditor, despite
any pre-proposal ultimatums, would be faced with accepting the
debtor’s offer or waiting and receiving even less.39 The debtor’s
                                          
38 This assumes the debtor can only prepare, propose, and have balloting on one
plan during the exclusivity period. Proposing multiple plans can be difficult,
especially because the disclosure statement hearing will be held at least 25 days
after the disclosure statement is filed. 11 U.S.C. §1125; F.R.B.P. 3017(a). The
analysis does not change significantly if we assume that the debtor has time to
propose several plans during the exclusivity period.
39 Baird & Picker argue that the exclusivity period has no effect on debtor-creditor
negotiations because it affects only who must formally propose a plan, so that the
parties can informally negotiate back and forth. They therefore model debtor-
creditor bargaining as consisting of alternating offers and counteroffers. Baird &
Picker, supra note __, at 321-22, 329. It is true that during the exclusivity period
creditors can communicate with the debtor and other creditors, and even propose
(informally) their own plans. Century Glove, Inc. v. First Amer. Bank of N.Y.,
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exclusivity period gives it a decisive advantage; it allows the debtor to
transform a bilateral bargaining game into an ultimatum game.
Given the one-iteration nature of the reorganization, the creditors
would rationally accept the offer.40
The question is, then, why the Bankruptcy Code would give
such an advantage to the debtor. This question can be divided into
two further questions: why should there be an exclusivity period,
and, if there should be an exclusivity period, why should it be given
to the debtor rather than to a creditor or another party.
To answer the first question, suppose that no one enjoyed the
exclusivity period. Suppose, for example, that E or H could propose
a plan and both would vote on whatever plans are proposed. If one
modeled this bargaining problem as alternating offers, the going
concern surplus would be roughly split between E and H.41 If E does
not have much bargaining power, as would be the case if H can cram
down a plan at any time, then H will receive most of the going
concern surplus. In sum, if the debtor did not enjoy an exclusivity
period, the debtor would receive less value, and given that the debtor
has no prebankruptcy entitlement to value, this result would respect
prebankruptcy entitlements without affecting the maximization of
going concern value.
With imperfect information, the analysis does not change much.
                                                                                     
860 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1988). But since plans are cumbersome to draft,
disclose, and vote upon, the debtor’s plan has a credible take-it-or leave it aspect
that the creditors’ oral counteroffers lack. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note __, at
257, 271-72 (“bargaining in the reorganization context differs from that in other
contexts, in which each round of bargaining . . .can take a very short period of
time”).
40 The debtor’s share might be smaller if it were uncertain of the creditors’ return
from voting no, or of the creditors’ rationality. For example, some creditors might
have a high probability of being creditors in future bankruptcies, and hence might
invest in a reputation for insisting on a greater respect for their pre-bankruptcy
entitlements by voting against a proposal of dTv. Since the debtor would likely
receive little or nothing if a plan were not confirmed during the exclusivity period
it might increase its proposed payout to creditors in order to insure acceptance. Cf.
David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 246-47 & n.3 (1982) (players may cooperate
in Prisoners’ Dilemma if uncertain as to other player’s payoffs and/or rationality).
41 See our discussion above, note __.
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If no one had an exclusivity period, but instead E or H could
propose a plan at any time, then again one could model this problem
as alternating offers. Suppose that E has private information about
its type and H does not have private information. If E moves first
and is a low type, it might delay or make an unacceptable offer in
order to signal its type. Either the delay is adequate to signal E’s
type, or, if not, H might screen by making an aggressive demand
that only a high type E would accept. If H moves first, it would
screen by making an aggressive demand that only a high type E
would accept, and, again, a low E would turn down this offer and
might even delay further in order to signal its type. This result is not
qualitatively different from our result when the exclusivity period
exists, because although the exclusivity period creates a less equal
distribution of bargaining power, it gives enough bargaining power
to both parties to make delay worthwhile. As noted above, delay
could be avoided only if H had no bargaining power at all, in which
case E would receive the entire going concern value.
With multiple creditors, the analysis becomes more complex.
Our three-party model, with alternating offers, implies that payoffs
will be {1/3(s-dT-ev), 1/3(s-dT-ev)+a 1d
T-ev, 1/3(s-dT-ev)+a 2d
T-ev} when
an exclusivity period exists. If no exclusivity period exists (e=T),
payoffs are {1/3(s-dTv), 1/3(s-dTv)+a 1d
T-ev, 1/3(s-dTv)+a 2d
T-ev}; the
plan proponent offers to split the surplus in round 0. As the number
of creditors increases, the debtor’s share becomes smaller, which is
desirable, but the creditors gain equally rather than pro rata, which is
inconsistent with prebankruptcy entitlements.
In practice, obtaining unanimous consent to a plan would seem
to be quite costly, especially when many creditors have claims and
when parties make errors about the value of the firm. Parties who
erroneously overvalue firms will resist plans that make small payouts.
As a result, some creditors might expect that their bargaining costs
would exceed the share of the surplus they expect to obtain, and
rationally refrain from bargaining. Sophisticated creditors, with
lower bargaining costs, would remain disproportionately involved, as
would large creditors. (The larger a creditor’s claim is, the more cost-
effective its monitoring the debtor would be before bankruptcy, and
hence it would likely have better information about the debtor.)
In any event, Chapter 11 provides for a combination of
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majoritarian and supermajoritarian voting, not unanimity. We
explore the reasons for this in Part IV. For now, assume that the
unanimity rule produces insurmountable difficulties and that instead
a simple creditor-based majority voting rule is in place.
As we saw in Part I.B.3., it is possible that cycling occurs under
majority rule.42 During the negotiation and voting stage, each
creditor will invest in proposing a plan or joining a coalition that will
propose a plan—a cost which we will call k, the costs of negotiating
with other creditors and the debtor, serving on a creditors’
committee, monitoring the debtor, and so on.43 Suppose that
creditors not in the winning coalition could be frozen out, receiving
nothing.44 Then each creditor would invest up to its possible payout
in bargaining costs if that would guarantee membership in the
winning coalition. Thus, the firm’s value would be completely
depleted by these strategic costs.
For example, suppose that there are 10 unsecured creditors with
c=$100 each, v=$250, s=$500, and d=1. Six creditors could form a
coalition that gives each member $83 and each non-member $0.
Each creditor would spend up to $83 to avoid being excluded from
the coalition. In the aggregate they would spend $830, thus
dissipating (and in fact exceeding) the entire amount of s. One might
argue that each creditor would discount its investment by the
probability that the investment would pay off (.6, assuming it
expected the other creditors to invest as well), and thus each would
spend no more than $49.80 to obtain membership in the winning
coalition. Even then, s would be virtually depleted.45 Moreover, the
creditors might continue to spend money even after they had made
                                          
42 If not, the non-cycling model suggests a division of value between all parties.
The analysis is the same as the analysis of bargaining under the unanimity rule,
above.
43 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) A1 (June 17, 1997).
44 That is, here we abstract away from the liquidation floor discussed in Part III.
45 From this perspective, 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(3)(D), which allows the recovery of
plan preparation costs in certain circumstances, has the perverse effect of
increasing strategic behavior. Doubtless conceived as a way to overcome the “free-
rider” problem and allow small creditors to afford plan preparation costs, it allows
a creditor to externalize strategic behavior costs and thus could induce a creditor to
spend more than its anticipated share.
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their initially-calculated expenditures, because they would not
necessarily reach agreement after the initial expenditures. It would
continue to be rational to invest in bargaining, as long as s>0; the
initial expenditures would be sunk costs. In theory, cycling between
options, or more generally the destabilization of a potential winning
coalition by a counterproposal from those left out of the coalition to
a subset of the coalition, can continue forever, so creditors could
spend an indefinitely large amount of money and never approve a
plan. We refer to these costs as the costs of “intrigue,” or rent-
seeking costs.
To prevent cycling, the judge might intervene and impose a
voting method such as a run-off that would produce a “winning”
plan (or the judge might select a plan and cram it down). However,
the plan that emerged victorious from such a method would
necessarily be arbitrary (i.e., sensitive to the order in which plans
were voted on) and thus would not reflect the preferences of
creditors as a whole in any meaningful sense.46 Section 1129(c)
allows the judge to confirm a plan from among those that meet the
consensual requirements of 1129(a) or the cram down requirements
of 1129(b) and directs the judge to “consider the preferences of
creditors” in choosing between plans. It does not, however, require
that the judge consider those preferences in any systematic way.47
The exclusivity period, however, provides a possible solution to
this problem. The cost of intrigue and the depletion of value that
results from delay caused by cycling can be eliminated if one party is
                                          
46 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 65, 141-43
(1982).
47 EPSTEIN, supra note __, at §11-20 (1992) (“None of [the questions about what
voting methods would be adopted on multiple plans] has yet been answered.”).
Nor does §1129(c) necessarily require the judge to follow the creditors’ preferences,
so long as he or she considers them. See In re Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R.
729, 735 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (“the court is of course free to make its own
determination [as to which plan to confirm] having taken into account such
preference [of the creditors]”).
F.R.B.P. 3018(c) directs the parties to utilize the “appropriate Official Form” in
accepting or rejecting a plan or plans; Official Form 14, “Ballot for Accepting or
Rejecting Plan,” provides creditors with space to identify their first and second
choices in case “more than one plan is accepted.” The use of certain voting
methods (e.g., Condorcet or Borda) would require some modification of the
Official Form, but it seems likely that a judge might do so in an appropriate case.
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given agenda control and allowed to exercise that power over a long
enough exclusivity period that it is in no one’s interest to incur the
costs of creating and breaking coalitions. Because the party with
agenda control bears the cost of delay (as in Part I.B.2, supra), it has
a strong incentive to avoid delay. But this reduction in intrigue and
delay, which helps to maximize the value of the firm, comes at a
cost. The party granted the exclusivity period receives with it the
power to violate prebankruptcy entitlements in its favor. At the
extreme, a debtor with complete bargaining power (for example, if
the creditors were entitled to no liquidation value or if they expected
to gain nothing post-exclusivity because of cycling) would offer the
creditors nothing.
The next puzzle is why the Code tolerates this harmful result by
giving the exclusivity period to the debtor, rather than to one of the
creditors or to a third party, such as the trustee—practices that
existed under the common law and prior bankruptcy statutes.48
To see the problem with such an approach, imagine that a single
creditor, chosen randomly or perhaps on the basis of size or
familiarity with the debtor, is given an exclusivity period at the onset
of bankruptcy. In the two-party model, the result seems
unobjectionable: the creditor retains more value than it would with a
debtor exclusivity period, consistent with prebankruptcy
entitlements. In the multi-party model, however, the creditor with
power during the exclusivity period would give the other creditors
only their discounted liquidation value (with e=T), retaining for itself
the going concern surplus plus its share of the discounted liquidation
value (as in Part I.B.1., the results would change quantitatively but
not qualitatively with e<T). Thus, although the debtor receives its
prebankruptcy entitlement (zero, when c>s), a single creditor likely
                                          
48 An exclusivity period in which two parties can propose plans would not lead to
qualitatively different results from the single party exclusivity period or no
exclusivity period alternatives discussed in the text. Imagine that the debtor (E)
and largest creditor (C1) were given the power to propose plans, and that there is
one other creditor (C2). If C2 has veto power over any plan, E and C1 would
collude against C2 by agreeing to a plan that divides between themselves the
benefit E would obtain in the traditional exclusivity period model, leaving nothing
for C2. Alternatively, if C2 lacks veto power and the support of two of the three
parties is necessary for plan confirmation, bargaining costs might be incurred in an
attempt to form a winning coalition.
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receives more than its prebankruptcy entitlement, and the violation of
the remaining creditors’ prebankruptcy entitlements is unchanged as
compared to the debtor exclusivity period. There is an improvement
only in the sense that, ex ante, creditors—not knowing whether they
will be lucky or not ex post—on average receive more value than
when the debtor enjoys exclusivity.49
It is not clear, then, that giving the exclusivity period to a
creditor would result in greater respect for prebankruptcy
entitlements. In addition, there is no reason to believe that such a
rule would reduce the likelihood of delay. A possible reason for
giving the exclusivity period to the debtor, however, emerges if one
relaxes the implicit assumption that all parties have identical
information about the optimal capital structure (which would
maximize s).
E might have better information than any creditor about s
because the managers have more information (and cheaper access to
additional information) about the firm and the market than the
creditors do. Thus, E would propose a plan that better exploited
business conditions than would a plan proposed by H. E’s
disproportionate power is consistent with the Condorcet Jury
Theorem’s implication that parties with better information should
enjoy weighted votes. One might argue that if H had the exclusivity
period, it could simply pay E for its superior information. However,
the sale of private information is highly inefficient, because the
possessor of the information cannot easily reveal its value without
also revealing its content. H would not know how much it had to
pay E in order to induce the proper level of information generation,
nor would H be able to determine whether E is honest. If H offered
E a portion of the reorganized firm’s equity, E would have some
incentive to gather and reveal information about the firm’s value. But
that incentive would be less than if E had agenda control, in which
case since E retains much or all of the going concern surplus it has a
significant incentive to choose the optimal capital structure.
Thus, there is a tradeoff: on the one hand, E likely has an
information advantage. On the other hand, E has perverse
incentives. But, as we have seen, so does the creditor. So on balance,
                                          
49 In addition, giving power to a creditor during the exclusivity period can make
sense when other rules, such as the equal treatment rule, are in place. See Part V.A.
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debtor exclusivity might make sense. A third alternative would be to
appoint a trustee and give the trustee an exclusive right to propose
the plan. As plan proponent the trustee, unlike the debtor or a
creditor, has no incentive to violate prebankruptcy entitlements, but
it is likely to have inferior information and incentives50 to propose a
value-maximizing plan as compared to the two alternatives.
Although our analysis shows that an exclusivity period is a good
idea, the argument in favor of giving agenda control to the debtor
remains more ambiguous. Only experience can show which agent
should have agenda control, and historical variation51 suggests there
is no obviously correct answer.
III. The Liquidation Value Floor and Absolute Priority
A. The Liquidation Value Floor
In Chapter 11 a plan will not be approved if any creditor who
objects to the plan receives less than it would under Chapter 7.52
Chapter 7 thus sets a floor on the amount that a creditor can receive
in Chapter 11. Creditors at the same level of priority must receive at
least as much as they would under the pro rata sharing rules in
Chapter 7, but they do not have to share pro rata in Chapter 11.
Creditors with high priority must receive at least as much as they
would in Chapter 7, but junior creditors may receive value as well in
Chapter 11.
Assume that courts can determine v without error. We will relax
this assumption subsequently. Initially, assume that no floor exists.
In the two-party perfect information model, with e=T, the payoffs
for (E, H) are (s-dTv, dTv) in round 0. The reason is that at every
round E must offer H at least as much as the discounted value of the
firm if it were liquidated at round T. Now, assume that the
liquidation floor exists. One might think that the court would strike
                                          
50 Like the judge, the trustee does not have proper incentives to gather additional
information, especially given limitations on trustee compensation. 11 U.S.C. §326.
51 If E tends to have better information relative to creditors in closely-held, but not
in public corporations, that might explain the Bankruptcy Act’s grant of agenda
control to the debtor in Chapter XI (intended for closely-held corporations) but
not in Chapter X (intended for public corporations).
52 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
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down a plan that offered H only dTv, because this amount is less
than the actual first-round liquidation value of the firm, v; and
therefore, in order to avoid this result, the debtor would offer (s-v,
v). The problem with this argument is that the Bankruptcy Code
requires the judge to enforce the liquidation floor only if a creditor
objects to the plan.53 But H would not object to the plan, because if
it objected, it would never be offered more than E’s initial offer,
receiving instead dT-tv in subsequent rounds. For example, in the
second round E would offer dT-1v, and the present value of that
amount in the first round is d(dT-1)v=dTv.54 Accordingly, the
liquidation floor does not guarantee H the undiscounted v. Indeed,
the liquidation floor has no effect in the two-party perfect information
model. It would have an effect—it would benefit the creditor—only if
the judge were required to enforce it against the creditor’s wishes!
In the model with two parties and imperfect information, the
liquidation floor similarly has no effect on behavior. Recall from the
discussion of this model that E will offer H at least as much as H
can expect in the succeeding round. If E has low value, it may delay
before it makes an offer to H, but the fact that E has private
information does not change its strategy of always offering H just
discounted liquidation value. Introduction of the liquidation floor
does not change this result. H will, in effect, waive its right to
undiscounted liquidation value, because if it refuses to accept E’s
offer of discounted liquidation value, a round is lost and with it the
time value of the offered payment, and in the next round E will
simply renew its offer of discounted liquidation value. This result
holds even if H has private information, or both parties have private
information, or if alternating offers occur at the expiration of the
exclusivity period.
These irrelevance results show the inadequacy of two-party
models. In the multiple party model with e=T the influence of the
liquidation floor can finally be seen. Initially, note that under a
unanimity rule any creditor can defeat a plan by voting against it; to
                                          
53 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7)(A)(i).
54 This assumes that if the creditor objects and the plan fails, the debtor keeps
agenda control and proposes another plan. If H could convince the judge to
convert the case to Chapter 7, then H would object, since it would then receive v
more quickly and hence with less discounting.
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prevent a creditor from voting against it, the debtor must offer the
creditor at least as much as the discounted value of its payoff in
round T. Whether or not a liquidation floor exists, the creditor
would receive at least its discounted share of the liquidation value.
However, Chapter 11 does not require that plans receive unanimous
consent, and we will see that there are good reasons for approving
plans which some creditors oppose. Suppose, then, that plans can be
approved by a simple majority rule and that no liquidation floor
exists. At any round the proponent of the plan will select a majority
of the creditors and offer them their share of the discounted
liquidation value; creditors outside the coalition would receive 0. The
insiders would vote in favor of the plan, the outsiders would vote
against the plan, and the plan would be approved. Payoffs for E and,
say, 3 creditors would be (s-( a 1+a 2)d
Tv, a 1d
Tv, a 2d
Tv, 0). This result
violates prebankruptcy entitlements in two ways. Creditors at the
same level of priority are paid different amounts, and the debtor (if
the proponent during the exclusivity period) obtains the going
concern surplus plus a portion of the liquidation value.
Now suppose that the liquidation floor is introduced. If the
proponent offers 0 to creditors outside the coalition, those creditors
would vote against the plan, and the plan would be rejected since
dissenting creditors receive less than their share of v. Anticipating
this, the proponent would offer all creditors their share of the
discounted liquidation value. If a creditor voted against the plan, it
would fail and delay would result, so each creditor would vote yes for




Tv). Prebankruptcy entitlements are more
fully respected both because creditors are treated equally and because
the debtor (if the proponent during the exclusivity period) receives
less (by a 3d
Tv) than without the liquidation floor. Note that, as in
the two-party model, the liquidation floor does not ensure that the
creditors obtain their share of the liquidation value, only that the
creditors obtain their discounted share of the liquidation value.
In the imperfect information model with multiple creditors, it is
difficult to predict precisely how the debtor would react, but it seems
on balance that the liquidation floor will increase the chance of
delay. Imagine that there are three creditors with equal claims and
with discount factors dh>dm>dl. E does not know the discount factors
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of the creditors, so it might delay in order to screen. The cost of
delaying is that E obtains its payoff later than if it does not delay. E’s
payoff is on average lower with the liquidation floor (since it must
give something to the creditor outside the coalition), so the per-
period cost of delay (d times E’s payoff) to E is lower. This would
tend to increase the likelihood of delay. But what is the benefit to E
of screening? It is difficult to predict E’s optimal strategy, but the
following logic is possible. In the absence of the floor, E could offer
1/3dh
Tv to two of the creditors, who would be certain to vote in favor
of the plan, and so the plan would be approved in the first round.
Alternatively, E could offer one creditor 1/3dm
Tv and the other
1/3dl
Tv. If these two creditors are the medium discount factor and
low discount factor creditors, respectively, they will accept
immediately, enabling E to obtain a higher payoff. This additional




liquidation floor, E could ensure no delay by offering all three
creditors 1/3dh
Tv. Alternatively, it could pay one creditor 1/3dh
Tv,
one 1/3dm
Tv and the third 1/3dl
Tv. If these are the high, medium,
and low discount factor creditors, respectively, they will accept. The
difference would again be 2/3dh
Tv-1/3dm
Tv- 1/3dl
Tv. So at least in
this situation, the cost of delay would be lower, and the benefit the
same, so delay would be more likely. However, it is difficult to
generalize. E might trade off the risk of delay and the gain from a
stingy plan in different ways.
We have assumed so far that the judge determines v accurately;
more realistically, judges estimate v with some error. Call this
estimate F. If all creditors are offered the discounted value of their
share of the liquidation value and vote in favor of the plan, the fact
that F diverges from v does not matter (even if F> s>v). Under
§1129(a)(7)(A)(i) the judge must confirm a plan that all creditors
approve, even if some creditors receive less than their pro rata share
of v. However, if E can anticipate F and F<v, it will offer creditors
outside the winning coalition a iF if a iF<a id
Tv. Those creditors will
vote against the plan but the judge will approve the plan over their
objections. Thus, if predictable error occurs, the liquidation floor’s
protection of prebankruptcy entitlements will be reduced. Because
our imperfect information model does not produce clear predictions,
we cannot say what effect error would have on the parties’ incentive
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to delay.
One might wonder how well the judge can estimate v. If the
court’s estimate of v is precise, then why not have it estimate s as
well and decide on a reorganization plan? If it can determine
liquidation value accurately, perhaps it can also determine the
optimal capital structure of the reorganized entity. We cannot
answer this question, but it is worth pondering whether it is
reasonable to suppose that courts have the right information to
determine the liquidation value of a firm but not good enough
information to determine its going concern value. It is possible that a
judge can rely sufficiently on market comparisons when valuing
individual assets but not when valuing an entire firm, which requires
the evaluation of synergies and the projection of demand into the
future. But since liquidation can involve the sale of lines of business
or even the entire firm as a going concern, one cannot clearly
distinguish “liquidation” value and “reorganization” value. It is
possible that judges tend to underestimate liquidation value in
Chapter 11 proceedings, because if they think liquidation value
includes the going concern surplus, they would have converted the
case to Chapter 7. If this is true, judges systematically underestimate
liquidation value in Chapter 11, with the result that the liquidation
floor provides less protection of prebankruptcy entitlements than it
would if judges actually knew the liquidation value. We will return
to this issue when we discuss cram down.
B. The Absolute Priority Rule and Cram Down
The “absolute priority rule” refers to a general principle that
junior creditors should not receive value unless senior creditors are
paid in full. The principle is reflected in two sections in Chapter 11.
First, section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), which provides that every individual
objecting creditor must receive as much as it would in Chapter 7,
provides more protection to a senior creditor than to a junior creditor
but does not guarantee that the senior creditor will be paid in full
before the junior creditor is paid. To see why, imagine that v=100
and s=200, and that C1 has a senior claim worth 120 and C2 has a
junior claim worth 120. Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) ensures that C1
will receive 100 if it objects, because in Chapter 7 the absolute
priority rule ensures that it would be paid before C2 received any
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value.55 But this means that in Chapter 11 C2 could receive as much
as 100, even though C1 would not be paid in full.
Second, section 1129(b) provides that if a senior class objects to a
plan and is not paid in full, a junior class will not receive any value.
This means that if a few creditors in a class object to the plan and are
not paid in full, but the class votes in favor of the plan, junior
creditors could be paid despite the fact that some objecting senior
creditors are not paid in full. “Cram down” means that as long as a
plan satisfies this requirement and the other rules of Chapter 11, a
plan can be approved even though one or more classes vote against
it, as long as at least one impaired class votes in favor of it.
Note that section 1129(b) does not prevent a plan from paying
two classes at the same priority level different amounts—for
example, 50 cents on the dollar to a class of unsecured trade creditors
and 90 cents on the dollar to a class of unsecured workers—although
a judge would need to find that the plan “does not discriminate
unfairly.”
In our two-party perfect information model, the APR accounts
for our continuing assumption that H can cram down a plan but that
E cannot. H can, in principle, propose a plan at round e that pays (0,
s) and confirm it (that is, cram it down) against E’s objection,
because E is junior to H. But E cannot in any round propose and
obtain confirmation of a plan that pays any amount to E unless H
consents. Thus, in our two-party perfect information model, E can
obtain value only because of its ability to use its power to delay in
order to extract concessions from H.
However, this argument assumes that the court can properly
enforce the APR. Suppose that in round e, H proposes an all-equity
plan that provides for (0 shares, 100 shares). H’s claim is c=100, and
H argues correctly that s=100. E objects to the plan, claiming that
s=200 and that therefore, because H’s prebankruptcy entitlement is
limited to the satisfaction of c, H should receive only 50 shares. How
can the judge evaluate this claim? If the judge cannot make an
accurate estimate of s, then he or she simply cannot determine when
cram down is appropriate. However, if the judge can make an
accurate estimate of s, what is the purpose of the Chapter 11 voting
                                          
55 11 U.S.C. §§725, 726.
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rules? After all, if the judge can estimate s, he or she can reorganize
the firm. The conclusion is inescapable that either judges should
determine the new capital structure by themselves (which seems
implausible) or that judges should never cram down a plan that pays
in the form of securities rather than cash.56 Judicially-sanctioned
cram down might also raise concerns if one assumed that bankruptcy
judges, lacking Article III status, might in some cases be biased
towards reorganization and against liquidation in an effort to save
local jobs.
A problem with the absolute priority rule is that sometimes
equity or junior creditors are willing to make loans to the
reorganized debtor and imperfect capital markets prevent third party
lenders from making such loans. It is possible that the going concern
surplus is maximized if such loans are made, that the junior interest
will make the loans only if they receive a share of the reorganized
firm, and that strict application of the absolute priority rule would
interfere with a plan that compensated the junior interest for this
contribution because a class of senior creditors object to the plan.
Although there is some controversy, case law suggests that there
exists a “new value exception” that prevents such interference.57
Under this exception, a junior class can receive a share of the
reorganization so long as it contributes “new value” to the
reorganized firm. New value usually is in the form of capital or
service.
This raises again the judicial information problem discussed
above. Application of the new value exception requires a judge to
determine the value of the junior interest’s contribution and its
compensation in the form of securities in the reorganized firm, so
that it can confirm that the compensation is justified by the
contribution. The contribution may be easy to evaluate, especially if
it is a straightforward capital investment. But the compensation, if in
                                          
56 If a plan is all-cash, cram down would still be puzzling: why not simply have the
judge distribute the cash according to the APR; as noted above, cram down does
not require respect for prebankruptcy entitlements among creditors at the same
priority level.
57 E.g., In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted
118 S.Ct. 1674 (1998). For an anlysis, see Baird & Picker, supra note __, at 325-
28.
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securities, is a function of s; and by hypothesis the judge does not
know what s is. So the new value exception, like the cram down
power itself, depends on the negative of the assumption—judicial
information problems—that motivate the Chapter 11 voting rules.
IV. Majority and Supermajority Rules, and Bicameralism
In Chapter 11 the proponent of the plan (usually the debtor)
divides the creditors into classes. Each class votes on the plan
separately. A class accepts a plan if (1) a majority of the claims in the
class are voted in favor of the plan; and (2) two thirds of the amount
of the claims in the class are voted in favor of the plan.58 It is
convenient to think of this system as bicameral, with a “creditors
house” in which each creditor holds one vote, and a “claims house”
in which each creditor has a vote for each dollar of its claim. Both
houses must approve the plan. We discuss the division into classes
(as opposed to having no classes) in Part V. Here we assume that all
creditors are in a single class and ask: why voting is bicameral, and
why use a majority requirement for creditors and a supermajority
requirement for claims.
A. Majority and Supermajority Rules
There is a continuum of possible voting rules, from dictatorship
to unanimity, with majority and supermajority rules in between. If
voters are sincere and voting costs are zero, the benefit of
information pooling increases as the inclusiveness of the voting rule
increases. This result argues for majority, supermajority, or
unanimity rules, as opposed to the dictatorship rule. Because the
benefit of information pooling increases with the number of voters at
a decreasing rate, the gain from moving to a high supermajority rule
to a unanimity rule will be small. Accordingly, if voting is costly, a
supermajority or majority rule is superior to the unanimity rule.
If voters act strategically, the benefit of more inclusive rules is
that it becomes more difficult to exclude parties from a winning
coalition and to approve a plan that transfers value from them to
which they are otherwise entitled. Thus, the more inclusive voting
rule reduces “exploitation costs.” However, as the inclusiveness of the
                                          
58 11 U.S.C. §1126(c).
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rule increases and more parties must agree, bargaining costs increase.
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the optimal voting rule reflects a
tradeoff between bargaining costs and exploitation costs.59
Dictatorship minimizes bargaining costs, but maximizes exploitation
costs. Unanimity minimizes exploitation costs, but maximizes
bargaining costs. Below, we analyze in more detail these strategic
problems.
In our two-party models, the voting rule is not an issue: either
both parties must consent, in which case a unanimity rule prevails, or
one party can cram down the plan, in which case dictatorship
prevails.
To understand the role of voting rules, we must turn to our
multi-party models. Initially, assume perfect information. Suppose
that n creditors have claims of varying proportion, a i, and varying
discount factors, di. At each round a plan can be confirmed only if
the voting rule is satisfied. We assume that the liquidation floor is in
effect, and that e=T.
Let us start with a dictatorship rule. One creditor, Cd, is given
the exclusive right to approve or reject the plan.60 Because of the
liquidation floor, the plan is approved if the dictator votes yes and
any creditor voting no receives at least its share of the liquidation
value. Each creditor obtains a idi
Tv and E retains the balance, which,
under normal assumptions about discount factors, will be at least the
entire going concern surplus. Despite the dictatorship, each creditor
receives the same amount, and all non-creditors vote in favor of the
plan. The reason is that E has all the bargaining power and will give
dictator and non-dictator alike just enough to obtain their
assent—that is, the discounted liquidation value. If E tried to give
the non-dictator less value, it would object to the plan (preferring
liquidation at round T), the liquidation floor would prevent
confirmation, and E would be forced to offer the higher amount in
                                          
59 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
63-72 (1965).
60 Dictatorship could work in many ways. The dictator could be selected randomly
from the pool of creditors, or from a subset comprising the larger or more
sophisticated creditors; or the dictator could be determined by rule, for example,
always the largest creditor; or the dictator could be selected by the judge using
some standard of appropriateness.
Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper 40
order to obtain the time value of its return.
Compare a unanimity rule. Using backward induction, E will
reason that it must give each creditor enough every round in order to
deter it from rejecting the offer with the expectation of eventually
obtaining a share of the liquidation value. Therefore, each creditor
will receive a idi
Tv and E will receive the balance. This is the same as
the result obtained under the dictatorship rule. Surprisingly, then,
unanimity and dictatorship produce the same distribution of value
among the parties—as would, by the same logic, any intermediate
rule such as majority or supermajority.
Let us now ask which rule produces the least delay. In the perfect
information model, no delay occurs. However, the unanimity rule
produces this result whether or not the liquidation floor exists,
whereas the majority and dictatorship rules would result in a payoff
of 0 to creditors outside the winning coalition in the absence of the
liquidiation floor. To see why, recall that if a creditor votes no under
the unanimity regime, the firm is actually liquidated, and all the
parties can anticipate what the yield will be. If a creditor votes no
under dictatorship or majority rule, then the proponent can obtain
confirmation by persuading the judge that the dissenting creditor
receives liquidation value. Thus, the judge can err, and the parties
can anticipate the judge (unlike the auction) can err. Of course, with
perfect information the debtor and creditors can anticipate error and
it will be reflected in the plan. But in the real world, this likelihood
of judicial error would create uncertainty that is likely to be costly.
Therefore, the unanimity rule would seem to dominate these other
rules along the dimension of judicial error cost.61
Now suppose that parties have private information about their
valuations. Under the unanimity rule, the debtor and every creditor
with relatively low valuations may signal, resulting in possibly
substantial delay. Under the dictatorship rule with the liquidation
floor, any creditor can also cause delay by voting against a plan that
gives the creditor average discounted liquidation value. Thus, there is
                                          
61 Other assumptions yield different results. For example, if some small creditors
were likely to vote no due to error or inattention, plan confirmation would be
difficult under a unanimity rule, while under a majority rule the debtor could give
small creditors their actual liquidation value and the plan could be confirmed even
if those creditors voted against the plan.
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no reason to believe that either rule (or majority rule) produces less
delay. However, one might argue that—as above—judicial error
might change this result. The difference between unanimity and
dictatorship (and majority) is that if a creditor votes no under
unanimity the bargaining proceeds to the next round, whereas if a
creditor votes no under dictatorship the plan will be confirmed if the
judge errs and concludes that the liquidation floor requirement has
been met. It might thus appear that delay will occur less often under
dictatorship (and majority) than under unanimity. However, it is
possible that anticipating judicial error, the parties may, under any of
the rules, modify their strategies in ways that we have not
considered.
Let us assume now that e<T, with perfect information. The
dictator would obtain the benefit of agenda control beginning in
round e, s-dT-ev, and it and the other creditors would obtain a id
T-ev.
Thus, the first-round payoffs to debtor, dictator, and n-1 other
creditors would be (s-des, de(s-dT-ev+ a dd
T-ev), a id
Tv), with the last
term referring to the payoff for each of the other creditors. By
contrast, under the unanimity rule we suppose that any creditor
would have an equal chance to propose the plan at any given round
t>e, and thus the creditors would have equal expected payoffs: (s-des,
de(1/n(s-dT-ev)+ a id
T-ev)). The last term reflects the fact that each
creditor receives a 1/n share of the surplus at round e, plus its
discounted share of the liquidation value at round e. Notice that (i)
the debtor receives the same payoff under both rules; (ii) the
creditors share more equally under the unanimity rule than under the
dictatorship rule, but that these shares reflect not prebankruptcy
entitlements but rather relative bargaining power. So although the
rules produce different distributions, there is no basis for preferring
one rule over the other—except again the unanimity rule alone does
not require the parties to anticipate a possibly erroneous judicial
determination of liquidation value.
One might think that majority rule would produce distributions
that lie between those produced by unanimity and dictatorship, but
this is not the case. To see why, imagine a creditor-based system.
Suppose there are 3 creditors, and assume away cycling. At round e,
each creditor has a 1/3 chance (regardless of the size of its
prebankruptcy entitlement) of proposing a plan that would include
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one other creditor in a coalition and exclude the third. This means
that at round e, each creditor has a 2/3 chance of being in a winning
coalition. If a creditor is in a winning coalition, it divides the round e
surplus with the single other creditor in that coalition. All creditors,
whether or not in the coalition, receive their discounted liquidation
value. Therefore, each creditor expects at round e to receive
2/3(1/2)(s-dT-ev)+ a id
T-ev. Each creditor would thus vote in favor of a
plan at round 0 that offered it (1/3)des-(1/3)dTv+a id
Tv. The debtor
must pay this amount to two creditors, but not necessarily to the
third. The debtor has a choice. It can either pay this amount to the
third creditor as well, or give that creditor its actual liquidation value.
If it gives the third creditor its share of the surplus, the third creditor
will vote in favor of the plan, and the plan will be approved
unanimously even though only a majority is needed. If the debtor
gives actual liquidation value to the creditor, the creditor will vote
against the plan, but the plan will be approved anyway because the
creditor receives actual (not discounted) liquidation value and a
majority approves the plan. To maximize its own share, the debtor
pays the third creditor min{(1/3)des-(1/3)dTv+ a id
Tv, a iv}. The third
creditor can be any of the three creditors, so the debtor will choose
which creditor to exclude in a manner that minimizes the total
payout to the three creditors. On average (as long as sometimes a
minority of creditors do worse if they receive their share of actual
liquidation value) the debtor is made better off under majority rule
than under dictatorship or unanimity rule, and creditors are treated
less equally than under these two alternatives. This result is
counterintuitive in light of the Buchanan and Tullock hypothesis,
but it follows from the fact that the debtor has more bargaining
power when it can play creditors against each other, than when it
must bargain with a single creditor (under dictatorship) or all the
creditors equally (under unanimity).
Suppose that information is imperfect. For dictatorship and
unanimity, as is the case when e=T, there is no reason to believe that
the rules would produce differences in the amount of delay. Under
both rules, all n creditors have an incentive to signal—in order to
persuade the debtor and other creditors that they attach a high value
to their liquidation share, and the debtor needs everyone’s
votes—due to the voting rule under unanimity and in order to
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prevent the judge from striking down a plan on the ground that it
violates the liquidation value floor under dictatorship. Thus, all
creditors have the power to prevent plan confirmation, and therefore
the ability to signal, although the point about judicial error for non-
unanimity voting rules remains valid. But with a majority rule delay
may be less likely. If the debtor excludes some creditors and pays
them their actual liquidation value, they cannot signal even if they
wish to do so—the judge will confirm a plan over their objection.
Now let us consider the possibility of cycling, which can occur
after the exclusivity period terminates, under both perfect and
imperfect information. Cycling will not occur under any voting rule
when e=T, so we confine our attention to the case when e<T. If the
dictatorship rule prevails, cycling will not occur. The reason is that in
round e the dictator makes a take it or leave it offer, and the other
creditors accept it. If the unanimity rule prevails, cycling is not
technically possible (since a winning coalition includes everyone, it
cannot be destabilized), but it seems reasonable to believe that delay
is more likely to occur than under dictatorship. The reason is not
that the dictatorship rule results in less voting than the unanimity
rule. As we have seen, even under the dictatorship rule everyone will
eventually vote in favor of the plan. But if we relax our assumptions
slightly, and note that in reality under the unanimity rule many
creditors may submit a blizzard of plans simultaneously, whereas
under dictatorship a single plan will be proposed, we see that in
practice a dictatorship rule should result in less delay than a
unanimity rule. Even more delay is likely if the majority rule prevails,
because actual cycling is possible. The greater the likelihood of delay
in this sense, the less the debtor needs to offer to creditors when e<T,
since the creditors cannot immediately capture s in round e.
One final point: some creditors, especially those with small
claims, might opt not to vote. Under §1126(c), the voting thresholds
must be met only among those creditors who cast ballots for or
against the plan. Thus, the debtor might be expected to curry favor
with larger creditors since they would be a larger percentage of
voting creditors than of all creditors. However, the debtor cannot
disfavor smaller creditors simply because most may not vote: even a
single negative vote from a small creditor could derail a plan, because
a dissenting creditor is protected by the liquidation floor.
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We conclude that majority rule protects prebankruptcy
entitlements less effectively than unanimity and dictatorship.
However, because under majority rule members outside of the
coalition who receive actual liquidation value cannot signal and cause
delay, signaling and hence delay may be reduced relative to the other
rules. The unanimity rule and the dictatorship rule do not appear to
produce differences with respect to prebankruptcy entitlements or
delay, but the unanimity rule avoids uncertainty that results from the
parties’ anticipation of a possible erroneous determination of
liquidation value by a court.
B. Bicameralism
One might think that the optimal voting rule, whatever it is, lies
somewhere on the continuum between dictatorship or unanimity, its
precise location depending on the optimal tradeoff among the factors
mentioned above. The drafters of the Code could have taken their
best guess, and left it at that. Instead, they added another layer of
complexity. The Code provides for a bicameral system, under which
the creditors vote, in effect, twice: once based on the principle of
one-creditor-one-vote, and once based on the principle of one-
dollar-one-vote.
To analyze this bicameral system of creditor-based and claim-
based voting, we will use unicameral claim-based voting as the
baseline, because that is the system typically used by corporations
outside of bankruptcy. We then ask, what is gained by requiring
creditor-based voting as well?
Initially, we note that bicameralism has an effect only under
majority or supermajority rule. Under a dictatorship rule, the single
creditor with the decisive vote in one house has control in both
houses, so the outcome does not change when a second house is
added. Under unanimity, if all the creditors agree in one house there
is necessarily agreement in the second house as well, in spite of the
fact that relative voting strength (nominally) differs between the
houses. For simplicity, we ignore supermajority rule, and,
accordingly, we confine our attention to majority rule.
Bicameralism influences voting outcomes only when there are
multiple creditors, so we set aside our two-party models. For the
sake of brevity we confine our analysis to bargaining under perfect
information. We assume e<T, because when e=T bicameralism
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produces the same outcome as unilateralism: with all the bargaining
power, the debtor gives each creditor its discounted liquidation
value.62
Assume n creditors with claims, ci. Under the creditor-based
majority rule, a majority coalition consists of any group of w
creditors, such that w/n > 1/2. Under the claims-based majority rule,
a majority coalition consists of any group of w creditors, such that
S i=1
wci/S i=1
nci > 1/2. If all creditors have the same claim, such that ci=c,
then the second formula becomes wc/nc=w/n > 1/2: the outcome
under creditor-based majority rule and claims-based majority rule is
the same. Thus, bicameralism cannot be explained if one assumes
that claims are homogenous.
Suppose, then, that claims are heterogeneous. It is immediately
clear that as the average size of claims in the winning coalition rises,
the first inequality can be violated while the second inequality holds.
In the extreme, a single creditor with a claim of $1000 can defeat 99
creditors with claims of $10 in the claims house while losing in the
creditors house. At first sight, then, one might argue that by adding
creditor-based voting to a baseline represented by claim-based
voting, the bicameral system of the Bankruptcy Code reduces the
power of large creditors but only when claims are heterogeneous.
The reality, however, is more complex.
To see why, we need to analyze the problem more rigorously.
Recall our discussion of majority rule in Section IV.A., which
assumed that each creditor has one vote. Recall that each of three
creditors expects at round e to receive 2/3(1/2)(s-dT-ev) +a id
T-ev.
Generalizing, let ri be a creditor’s probability of being in the winning
coalition. Then, each creditor expects at round e to receive (ri/w)(s-
dT-ev) + a id
T-ev. The debtor must pay the excluded creditors
(min{(ri/w)(s -d
T-ev) + a id
T-ev, a iv}). At round 0, payoffs for the




T-ev) + a id
T-ev], a iv}). The debtor will receive s-
S i=1
w[de[(ri/w)(s-d
T-ev) + a id
T-ev] - S i=w+1
n[min{de[(ri/w)(s -d
T-ev) + a id
T-
ev], a iv}]. To determine the relative effects of the creditors and
claims systems, we need to examine their effects on r and w.
How is r determined? To answer this question, one must
                                          
62 See text accompanying supra note __.
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imagine how creditors bargain beginning at round e. Each creditor
has an equal 1/n chance of proposing the plan, so the ability to
propose cannot account for differences in r. Instead, what matters is
whether a creditor, as the proponent, can persuade other creditors to
vote for its plan and whether this creditor is likely to be selected by
other proponents. Consider the following five possible distributions
(1-5) for five creditors, A-E.
A(r) B(r) C(r) D(r) E(r)
1 10(.6) 10(.6) 10(.6) 10(.6) 10(.6)
2 10(.75) 10(.75) 10(.75) 10(.75) 1(0)
3 10(1) 10(1) 10(1) 1(0) 1(0)
4 10(1) 10(1) 1(.33) 1(.33) 1(.33)
5 10(1) 1(.5) 1(.5) 1(.5) 1(.5)
In distribution 1, the proponent (which is each creditor with
probability 1/5) is indifferent about which other two creditors join in
a winning coalition. Because a coalition must have three creditors,
each creditor has a three in five chance of being selected. Therefore,
r=0.6. In distribution 2, one might also think that for each creditor
r=0.6, but this is false. If the proponent is a large creditor (A-D), it
will prefer adding other large creditors to its coalition rather than
small creditors. The reason is that the plan must pay excluded
creditors their discounted liquidation value, and large creditors have
higher liquidation values than small creditors (assuming a constant
discount factor63); and the plan must pay included creditors a portion
of the surplus, but this amount is invariant with respect to the size of
a claim. So a proponent always does better by including the larger
creditors and excluding the smaller creditors. Accordingly, r=.75 for
the large creditors but r=0 for E.64
                                          
63 If a large creditor’s discount factor is high enough, it might be replaced in the
winning coalition by a relatively small creditor whose discount factor is low.
64 One might argue that r=.2 for E, because E would include itself in the winning
coalition when it is the plan proponent. In that case r for A-D would be
.75(.8)+.5(.2)=.7. Note that this changes only the magnitude, but not the
direction, of the effect of the size of a creditor’s claim on r.
For simplicity, however, we ignore this possibility, noting that smaller creditors
likely have less information than larger creditors about maximizing s, and thus
their plans might be taken less seriously by the group of creditors as a whole.
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This does not mean that small creditors never have voting power.
In distribution 4 the small creditors have r=.33 because three
creditors are necessary to form the winning coalition; each small
creditor has a 1/3 probability of being selected. But one would not
observe a coalition of, say, A, C, and D, because A prefers to join B
in order to avoid paying B’s high discounted liquidation value.
As to w, w is the smallest integer such that w>n/2.
In the claims house, r will differ under certain conditions (as
italicized).
A (r) B (r) C (r) D (r) E (r)
1 10 (.6) 10 (.6) 10 (.6) 10 (.6) 10 (.6)
2 10 (.75) 10 (.75) 10 (.75) 10 (.75) 1 (0)
3 10 (.67) 10 (.67) 10 (.67) 1 (0) 1 (0)
4 10 (1) 10 (1) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
5 10 (1) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
In distribution 3, A would never choose D or E for the reasons given
above, and now a 2-party coalition is sufficient, rather than the 3-
party coalition needed under the creditors system. This also explains
the difference in 4. As to w, w can now be as low as 1, if a single
creditor has a claim larger than half of the aggregate claims.
To compare the two systems, focus on the debtor’s payoff
function, and in particular the term, S i=1
w[de[(ri/w)(s-d
T-ev) + a id
T-ev],
which the debtor wants to minimize. We saw above that both r and
w are on average smaller in the claims system than in the creditor
system. The reason is that under the claims system fewer creditors
will be in the coalition (w) and thus each creditor has on average a
smaller chance of being in the coalition (r). The reduction in r as one
moves from creditors voting to claims voting straightforwardly
reduces the value of this expression, making the debtor better off.
The reduction in w, however, has an ambiguous effect. On the one
hand, it reduces the number of terms in the expression, and
therefore, because all terms are positive, it reduces the aggregate. On
the other hand, it increases the value of each term, and therefore it
increases the aggregate. There is thus no reason to believe that on
average moving from creditors voting to claims voting increases (or
decreases) the payoff to the debtor.
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As an example, consider distribution 5. Under the creditor
system, A would be in the coalition with a probability of 1, and B-E
would be in the coalition with a probability of 0.5; w=3. Assume
d=0.9, e=2, T=3, s=10, v=4. A must be paid (.81)[(1/3)(10-
(.9)(4))+(10/14)(.9)(4)]=3.81. Suppose the debtor chooses to include
B and C. Then B and C each receive (.81)[(0.5/3)(10-
(.9)(4))+(1/14)(.9)(4)]=1.07. D and E each receive
min((.81)[(0.5/3)(10-(.9)(4))+(1/14)(.9)(4), (1/14)(4))]=0.29. Thus,
the debtor retains 10-3.81-2(1.07)-2(.29)=3.47.
Under the claims system, A would be in the coalition with
probability of 1, and the small creditors would be in the coalition
with probability 0; w=1. A must be paid (.81)[(1)(10-
(.9)(4))+(10/14)(.9)(4)]=7.27. The four small creditors receive their
discounted liquidation value, 0.21. (They have a 0 probability of
being in the winning coalition, and thus would vote in favor of this
offer—unlike a creditor with r>0 they do not suffer from being
excluded.) Thus, the debtor retains 10-7.27-4(0.21)=1.89 < 3.47. In
this example, the creditors receive higher payouts under claims
voting than under creditors voting, but—as we said above—one
cannot generalize.
Against this rather confusing background one can evaluate
bicameralism. If the bicameral system required a majority of
creditors and a majority of claims, it would produce an outcome
identical to that of a unicameral creditor system. The reason is that
under creditor majority rule, the plan proponent prefers to include
the largest creditors in the coalition; therefore, any coalition that
obtains a majority under creditor majority rule will also contain a
majority of claim value. Thus, the comparison between majority
bicameralism and the claim system is the same as the comparison
between the creditor system and the claim system.
Chapter 11’s bicameralism, however, provides that the claim
house must approve the plan by a 2/3 supermajority. To see the
effect of this requirement, consider Table 1.
Bicameralism affects the outcome under creditor majority rule
only when claims are relatively homogenous. The reason is that
when claims are heterogeneous, the coalition under creditor majority
rule includes the largest creditors, so their claims frequently
aggregate to greater than two thirds of the total claim value. Only
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when claims are more homogenous must the proponent add
creditors to the coalition so that claim value reaches two thirds. But
we observed earlier that the creditor system and the claim system
produce the same outcome when claims are homogenous. The
difference in row 1 above, then, arises because in Chapter 11’s
bicameral system the claims house requires a 2/3 supermajority while
the creditor house requires only majority. So Chapter 11’s bicameral
system is basically the same as a majority creditor system except that
it requires a supermajority when claims are homogenous. We see no
normative justification for this result.

















9 (1) 9 6 (1) 5 (1) 6 (1)
1 (10), 8 (1) 18 3 (10,1,1) 5 (10,1,1,1,1) 5 (10,1,1,1,1)
2 (5), 7 (1) 17 4 (5,5,11) 5 (5,5,1,1,1) 5 (5,5,1,1,1)
3 (4), 6 (1) 18 3 (4) 5 (4,4,4,1,1) 5 (4,4,4,1,1)
5 (2), 4 (1) 14 5 (2) 5 (2,2,2,2,2) 5 (2,2,2,2,2)
To summarize, distinguish the competition over value between
the debtor and the creditors as a group, and the competition over
value among creditors. In the first competition, the relative merits of
the claims system and the creditors system are ambiguous. In the
second competition, small creditors do better under the creditors
system than under the claims system, because under the former
system small creditors are more likely to be included in the winning
coalition. The bicameral system does not affect these results, except
by requiring a supermajority when claims are homogenous—a
puzzling requirement.
One might argue that for the purpose of information pooling,
the claim system dominates the creditor system. If larger creditors
have more information about a firm then their votes are entitled to
greater weight under the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Indeed, small
and uninformed creditors like trade creditors, warranty holders, and
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workers might have no information about the value of the firm.65 If,
for them, p=0.5, their vote should have no weight. Thus, the goal of
information pooling implies reliance on claim voting, while the goal
of avoiding exploitation does not clearly favor one system over the
other. We leave open the question how these competing goals can be
reconciled, but see no reason to believe that requiring both kinds of
voting in a bicameral system is the solution.
V. Classification and the Equal Treatment Rule
Chapter 11 requires that a reorganization plan divide creditors
and other interest-holders into classes66 and states that claims placed
in a given class must be “substantially similar” to one another.67 The
statute does not forbid the division of similar claims into different
classes, but the case law tends to disapprove of this practice. For the
moment, we assume that this practice is forbidden. The Code also
requires that all members of a class be treated equally.68 The question
we address now is why the Code would permit and require the
division of claims into classes, rather than having a single class
consisting of all the claims. We start by discussing equal treatment,
then move on to classification.
A. Equal Treatment
Because classification and equal treatment are issues only if there
is more than one creditor, we cannot rely on our two-party models.
Instead, we must use the multi-creditor models. Begin by assuming
that the equal treatment rule prevails but that classification is not
                                          
65 The correlation between claim size and information need not always be positive.
For example, two banks might have identical size loans to the debtor, but the bank
with better information might have the smaller claim in bankruptcy, if it used its
information to accelerate part of its loan before the preference period, or to decline
to renew part of th e loan. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role
of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. RE V. 1073, 1094-95
(1995) (describing insolvency debtor requirement in definition of a preference as
creating incentive for banks to accelerate loans pre-insolvency, in turn signaling
other creditors of impending problems).
66 11 U.S.C. §1123(a).
67 11 U.S.C. §1122(a).
68 11 U.S.C. §1123(a)(4).
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permitted. This would mean that the debtor must give every creditor
the same number of cents on the dollar. Suppose that there are n
creditors with claims of ci, and e<T. Recall the payoffs under the
dictatorship, unanimity, and majority rules:
Debtor  Dictator/ Coalition  Other creditors  
Dict. s-des de(s-dT-ev+ a dd
T-ev) a id
Tv










where x= S i=1
w[de[(ri/w)(s-d
T-ev) + a idT-ev]] + S i=w+1
n[min{de[(ri/w)(s -
dT-ev) + a id
T-ev], a iv]}].
The equal treatment rule changes these payoffs in significant
ways. Consider first dictatorship. At round e, the dictator knows that
it cannot insist on a plan that treats it better than the other creditors.
If it did, a court would strike down the plan even if the other
creditors agreed to it. Thus, the dictator must propose a plan that
divides the round e surplus equally, giving each creditor (including
itself) a is. Accordingly, in round 0 the debtor will propose to pay
each creditor dea is. All creditors, including the dictator, will consent,
because dea is>a id
Tv. Thus, the equal treatment rule transfers value
from the dictator to other creditors without affecting the debtor’s
payoff, and it ensures greater respect for prebankruptcy entitlements
of the creditors, because their share is less discounted and because it
reflects s rather than v.
We have assumed that each creditor has the same discount
factor, d. If discount factors vary, then payoffs under dictatorship










Tv}. The equal treatment rules
requires payoffs of {s- dh
es, dh
e
a is}, where dh is the highest discount
factor of any creditor.69 Because dh ‡ dd the debtor’s payout is likely
                                          
69 If creditors were instead offered only dd
e
a is, any creditor with a discount factor
greater than the dictator’s would vote against the plan. If the dictator were a large
financial institution, its discount factor might tend to be on the high end of the
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reduced by the equal treatment requirement, and between-creditor
payments also more fully reflect prebankruptcy entitlements (since
the latter are not dependent on di). The results are the same under
the unanimity and majority rules.
Notice that with equal treatment the majority rule loses the
disadvantage discussed in an earlier section, namely, that the debtor
can, by exploiting creditors’ fear of being excluded from the winning
coalition, give each creditor less than what it would receive under
unanimity and dictatorship. With equal treatment, each creditor
obtains the same payoff whether or not included in the majority
coalition. Thus, the debtor cannot use the threat to exclude creditors
from the coalition in order to obtain more than s-des.
However, the equal treatment rule can create problems when
creditors differ with respect to their postbankruptcy interests.
Suppose that n creditors have identical claims worth c, but that m<n
creditors (trade creditors or workers, for example) have a
postbankruptcy interest worth h. Note that h must be included in
the social value of the firm, so even if s=v, the firm should be
reorganized: its social value is v+mh. For simplicity, suppose that
d=1. Suppose the debtor proposes a plan that gives each creditor s’/n,
where s’<v, but s’+mh>v. The ordinary creditors would vote against
the plan, because s’/n<v/n, and the trade creditors would vote in
favor of the plan, because s’/n+h>v/n.70 Under a unanimity rule, or a
majority rule if m<n/2, the socially valuable plan would not be
confirmed if equal treatment is required. If equal treatment is not
required, however, the debtor would offer the banks v/n and the
trade creditors v/n - h; the plan would be confirmed. Thus, equal
treatment prevents desirable reorganizations.
The equal treatment rule makes majority rule as attractive as
dicatatorship and unanimity, and it improves the results under all
three rules by reducing the debtor’s payoff, increasing the creditors’
payoffs, and producing payoffs that more closely track prebankruptcy
                                                                                     
range of creditors’ discount factors. If a small creditor had the highest discount
factor, the debtor might give it a hv, and then pay the rest of the creditors their
share of liquidation value discounted by the next-highest discount factor.
70 To be sure, the trade creditors might voluntarily give up some of their cash, see
11 U.S.C. §1123(a)(4), but bargaining and coordination costs might interfere with
this result.
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entitlements. However, the equal treatment rule has a significant
disadvantge. It interferes with confirmation of plans where creditors
have different postbankruptcy interests, and these postbankruptcy
interests summed with the going concern value of the firm exceed its
liquidation value.
B. Classification
Classification is best understood against the backdrop of the
equal treatment rule. As we saw above, the equal treatment rule is
advantageous when creditors have different discount factors and/or
when majority rule is used, but disadvantageous when creditors have
differing postbankruptcy interests. Without the equal treatment rule,
the debtor would not exercise its classification power (unless
compelled by a court), because classification could only make it more
difficult for a plan to be approved (setting aside cram down).71 If the
debtor did not have the support of a majority of creditors and 2/3 of
claims from among all the creditors, it could not obtain approval of
the plan from all the classes produced by any possible division of
creditors into subsets.72 If the plan would pass if presented to the
creditors grouped in a single class, it might fail once multiple classes
are formed, since a minority that lacked veto power in a single class
might have veto power as part of a smaller class. Put another way,
the greater the number of classes, the more creditors whose assent is
necessary for plan approval, which would reduce exploitation and
increase bargaining costs, both to the disadvantage of the debtor.
Thus, the debtor’s power to classify can be seen as a response to
the rigidity created by the equal treatment rule. As illustrated above,
the equal treatment rule interferes with reorganization when
creditors have different postbankruptcy interests.73 Recall the
                                          
71 Thus, since Canadian reorganization rules utilize class-based voting but lack
equal treatment or cram down, we would expect to see most classification disputes
feature creditors arguing they should be classified separately, in order to increase
their bargaining power, while in the U.S. the picture would be more mixed, since
separate classification increases a creditors’ voting power but deprives it of equal
treatment protection and raises the threat of cram down even if it votes no.
72 See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS R EORGANIZATION IN
BANKRUPTCY 704 (1996).
73 Other examples of extra-plan returns that could be captured only through
unequal treatment include workers avoiding job dislocation costs or a restriction in
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example above, where the equal treatment rule prevented the debtor
from obtaining support for an optimal plan by giving the trade
creditors less than the banks. With the power to classify, the debtor
can place the banks in one class and give them s/n each in cash or
securities, and the trade creditors in another class and give them s’/n
each. Because each trade creditor expects an additional h, and
s’/n+h>v/n, all creditors would approve the plan.
However, while classification mitigates the postbankruptcy
interest problem,74 it creates a new problem. The debtor can use the
classification power to gerrymander; that is, to create classes
opportunistically in order to maximize its return at the expense of
the creditors (as compared to one class with the equal treatment rule
in effect). There are at least three forms of gerrymandering. First, if
each creditor i has a different discount factor, di, then the debtor
would want to make a different offer to each creditor, such that
pi(0)=di
Tv. The debtor avoids the equal treatment rule by placing
impatient creditors in a separate class, and offering them less than
patient creditors with identical prebankruptcy interests. If
gerrymandering were unrestricted, the debtor could put every
creditor in its own class and pay it a different share, thus completely
undermining the effect of the equal treatment rule. Indeed, the
debtor could go further and form classes in which impatient
creditors can outvote a minority of patient creditors, and approve
plans that discriminate against the latter.75
Second, even if courts can strike down schemes that too
                                                                                     
the number of creditors that receive stock in the reorganized firm in order to avoid
the cost of public registration, see In re Piece Goods Shops Co., 88 B.R. 778, 788
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995).
74 Admittedly, this analysis raises the puzzle of why creditors who would seem to
have postbankruptcy interests are sometimes offered more by the debtor than
creditors who seem not to have such interests. E.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 89
F.3d 942 (2d Cir. 1996) (workers’ compensation claims held by workers classified
separately and paid more than such claims held by surety). Perhaps the
postbankruptcy interest is reciprocal—i.e., the firm needs the workers in order to
maximize its value much as the workers need a reorganization to maximize their
payout.
75 This kind of opportunism is possible only when e<T and the outvoted, more
patient creditors would need to receive at least their share of actual liquidation
value, given the protection of the liquidation floor.
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obviously classify creditors by discount factor, debtors can
gerrymander in more subtle ways. One such way is to divide a
creditor’s claim among several classes (“overlap”). This practice is not
necessarily undesirable, because sometimes creditors have different
kinds of claims and therefore different interests; for example, a
secured and an unsecured claim.76 It is common to divide secured
and unsecured claims of a single creditor into two classes. But if the
debtor has this power, it can also classify creditors in an exploitative
way. For example, suppose that the intra-class voting rule is
bicameral, requiring a majority of claims and of creditors, and that
the equal treatment rule is in effect. Also assume that e<T, so that
creditors expect to obtain more than dTv. The debtor has three
creditors, who have claims worth 401, 401, and 300 respectively.
Respect for prebankruptcy entitlements requires the creditors to
receive roughly (4/11, 4/11, 3/11). If the distribution of bargaining
power is such that creditors will receive 100 in the aggregate, the
creditors should receive 36, 36, and 27 respectively, and they would
in a single class with equal treatment. Suppose now that the debtor
divides the creditors into the following classes:
C1 C2 C3
Class 1 300 300 100
Class 2 101 101 200
The debtor can obtain majorities of claims and creditors in both
classes by attracting the votes of C1 and C2; C3 can be outvoted in
both classes. By assumption, C1 and C2 will vote in favor of a plan
that offers them a payout of 36. The debtor can thus obtain their
assent by offering a payout of 84 to Class 1 and a payout of 1 to
Class 2. To see why, observe that C1 and C2 each have a share of
3/7 in class 1. Thus, given the intra-class equal sharing rule, they
each receive 3/7 of 84, or 36. C3 receives only 12. The debtor’s total
payout is only 85, versus the 100 it would need to pay with a single
class. Thus, debtor’s classification power allows it to violate
prebankruptcy entitlements while still respecting the (intra-class)
equal treatment rule.
                                          
76 11 U.S.C. §§506(a), 1111(b).
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In a third form of gerrymandering, if cram down is available, the
debtor can treat one class well enough that it votes in favor of the
plan, but treat other classes poorly,77 and then cram down the plan
on the basis of one class having assented.78 If this were too obviously
unfair,79 the debtor might propose an all-equity plan, overvaluing the
reorganized firm’s equity. This would give lower-priority classes
(including shareholders) a greater payout than if the absolute priority
rule were followed. More senior classes might vote against such a
plan because their payout (in equity) is too low given the true value
of the reorganized firm. But a class of junior creditors might vote
yes, since the payment “in full” of senior creditors with over-valued
shares could leave junior creditors with a greater share of the equity,
and hence a higher real payout, than would a more accurate
valuation.80
The debtor’s gerrymandering power is not unrestrained.
Gerrymandering to produce an assenting class (in order to then seek
cram down) is constrained by case law.81 Overvaluation can be
                                          
77 That is, give them less than their bargaining power would otherwise require. For
example, creditors classified separately but at the same priority level could be
offered different payouts. This again assumes that creditors have enough
bargaining power to obtain more than dTv (e<T), since creditors in a “poorly”
treated class who vote against a plan receive the protection of the liquidation floor.
78 11 U.S.C. §1129(b), (a)(10).
79 Cram down requires the judge to find that the plan is “fair and equitable” and
“does not discriminate unfairly.” 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).
80 See Stuart C. Gilson et al., Valuation of Bankrupt Firms 22-23 (Aug. ‘97 draft).
81 E.g., In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“thou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an
affirmative vote on a reorganization plan”); In re Boston Post Road Ltd. P’ship, 21
F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994). But a plan proponent may still offer a legitimate business
reason to justify a classification having that effect. Id.
On this note, the elimination of §1124(3) in 1994 seems difficult to justify.
Section 1124(3) stated that a class paid the allowed amount of its claims in cash on
the effective date of a plan was unimpaired (and hence deemed to vote yes). With
its elimination, a class paid 100 cents on the dollar in cash and that voted in favor
of the plan would provide the vote of an “impaired” class and meet the
§1129(a)(10) requirement for cramdown even though another class or classes
might be the true residual claimants under the plan. The subsection was
eliminated in reaction to In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1994), in which an unsecured class was paid in full but not given postpetition
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constrained by a judge who is alert to voting patterns that suggest
misvaluation. But given the judge’s imperfect information about the
value of the firm (which, recall, motivates the voting rules), the real
difficulty of predicting its future (reorganized) profitability,82 and the
fact that different plans will in fact differ in value, depending upon
how effectively they deploy the firm’s assets, it will be difficult for a
judge to police strategic misvaluation. And if courts err when
evaluating classification schemes, they will sometimes strike down a
desirable plan that discriminates among creditors in order to solve
the problem of differing postbankruptcy interests.
The “substantial similarity” requirement constrains the ability of
the debtor to sneak some patient creditors into an impatient class,
but it does not prevent the creation of impatient classes. Presumably,
this is because creditors with low discount factors (those who face
credit rationing or otherwise less competitive credit markets) might
also be those who have some particular interest in a reorganized
debtor (e.g., workers or trade creditors) and thus may need to be
classified separately in order to maximize the value of the
reorganized debtor. Separate classification on the basis of
postbankruptcy interest in the reorganized debtor has been upheld in
the case law.83
Gerrymandering that creates or exploits “overlap” situations
could be reduced through a more rigorous application of the
“substantial similarity” requirement. That is, in terms of the example
given above, the judge could require that C3’s claims be classified
separately (say, as 1A and 2A) on the basis that, given its different
proportional overlap, C3’s claims are not substantially similar to the
claims of C1 and C2. However, given that overlap gerrymandering
occurs only when creditors have enough bargaining power to obtain
more than dTv, the more rigorous the enforcement of the substantial
similarity requirement, and hence the more fine-grained the
classification, the greater will be bargaining costs (since more
                                                                                     
interest in spite of the debtor’s solvency. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 47-48 (1994).
82 Gilson, supra note __, at 16. There may be reasons other than intra-creditor
redistribution for misstating a firm’s value in a plan, such as overstating value to
gain greater future depreciation or other tax advantages. Id. at 12.
83 Teamsters Nat’l Freight Indust. Negot. Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d
581, 584, 587 (6th Cir. 1986).
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creditors have veto power) and thus the greater the likelihood of
costly delay. In addition, the nature of the “substantial similarity”
requirement is such that attempts by the judge to prevent
exploitative classification without in effect requiring complete
similarity would be difficult or impossible. This is because creditors
can be substantially similar to each other in non-transitive ways.84
Thus, we could imagine a situation in which C4 and C5 are
substantially similar to each other, but not to C6, in terms of having
a postbankruptcy interest in the reorganized debtor, while C5 and
C6 are substantially similar to each other, but not to C4, in terms of
having a chance to collect from a third party guarantor as well as
from the debtor.85 One solution would be to require separate
classification of all three creditors, but if that is a requirement of
“complete” similarity, and in practice “substantial similarity” is the
standard then considerable latitude as to how to classify will rest
with the plan proponent. The latter could be expected to classify C5
with either C4 or C6 by looking to its own advantage.
However, one might argue that if the judge can accurately police
gerrymandering in this way, then he must have enough information
to determine the optimal plan by himself. In all of these cases, the
judge can strike down a plan only if he can tell whether the plan
classifies in order to transfer value to the debtor, or in order to
maximize plan value. But he can only make this determination, it
appears, if he can estimate plan value. If the rules for policing
gerrymander are mechanical, then either the debtor can anticipate
the rule and work around it to his own benefit, or the rule will
interfere with the flexibility needed to ensure that value is
maximized. It is possible, however, that the judge can obtain
sufficient information from voting patterns in order to make an
educated guess about whether gerrymandering is present.
Let us summarize the argument so far. The equal treatment rule
can reduce exploitation against impatient creditors and allow the
                                          
84 See Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 468 (1996).
85 A distinction recognized as significant for classification purposes in In re
Johnston, 21 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1994) (Steelcase is situated differently from
other unsecured creditors. . . . its claim. . .is partially secured by collateral of . . .
the primary obligor”).
5 9 A Positive Theory of Chapter 11
choice of a voting rule that reduces bargaining costs (though here
dictatorship would seem to dominate majority or supermajority rules,
especially since it also eliminates cycling concerns). This tends to
protect prebankruptcy entitlements and capture going concern value.
But equal treatment also interferes with plans that can prevail only if
creditors with postbankruptcy interests can trade the value to which
they are entitled in bankruptcy to a debtor who would otherwise
prefer liquidation. Classification enables the debtor to escape this
problem by allowing it to classify such creditors separately. But
unlimited classification enables the debtor to avoid the equal
treatment rule, returning us to the initial problem of exploitation.
The classification power makes sense only if courts can prevent the
debtor from using that power opportunistically, but it is not clear
that courts have this ability.
C. Uncertainty about the Firm’s Value
We suggested in Part II that Chapter 11 might assign agenda
control to the debtor because it has, on average, the best information
about the bankrupt firm: that is, about whether there is a going
concern surplus (rather than v ‡ s) and about which reorganization
plan maximizes s. However, often a creditor or creditors86 will have
better information than the debtor, or the best information might
come from a combination of the debtor’s and creditors’ information.
One possible role of classification87 is to enable the debtor to give
creditors an incentive to invest in information about s.88
Imagine that there are 10 tort creditors (each with a claim of 10)
and 1 bank creditor (with a claim of 50); v=110, and d=1. Given
current information about the firm’s prospects in its volatile market
sector, the debtor and the creditors estimate that s is 2/3 likely to be
                                          
86 Certain creditors likely have better information, and/or cheaper access to
additional information, about the firm’s value. Tort claimants or taxing authorities,
for example, might have less access to valuation information than banks. See
THOMAS H. JACKSON,  THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 218
(1986).
87 See George G. Triantis, Keeping the Gates to Corporate Reorganization, 28 CAN.
BUS. L.J. 279, 291 (1997) (book review) (suggesting classification might play a
role in eliciting information about the debtor from creditors).
88 Ideally, the debtor would classify in such a way that equalizes pi for each
creditor. See Miller, supra note __, at 187.
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50 and 1/3 likely to be 200. The expected value of s=100. Assume
further that the bank, at a cost of 1, could gather enough
information to resolve the uncertainty about s, but that the debtor
and the creditors cannot, and that the bank cannot credibly convey
information to the tort creditors or the debtor. If the debtor creates a
single class, the class will reject any reorganization plan, because the
expected value of the plan to each tort creditor (6.7) is less than the
expected value of its share of liquidation (7.3). The bank will not
bother to invest 1 in determining the true value of s, because even if
it discovers that s=200, no one will believe it.89 The debtor, then,
gains nothing by proposing a plan. The bank, lacking veto power,
will not incur the cost of gathering the additional information.
By classifying the bank separately, however, the debtor could
induce90 the bank to make the investment in additional information,
and that investment would be socially valuable. If the bank does not
make the investment, it will receive its one-third share of the firm’s
liquidation value, 36.3. In contrast, if the bank makes the
investment, it is 33% likely to learn that s=200. In that case, the bank
prefers reorganization to liquidation. It could induce the debtor to
amend the proposed payouts under the plan so that the tort creditors
would vote in favor of the plan. The tort creditors expect their share
of a liquidation to be 2/3 of 110, or 73.33. They would thus vote in
favor of a plan giving them 74% of the reorganized firm’s equity
(which they estimate to be worth 100). The bank would receive the
remaining 26% of the equity; but because the bank knows the firm
has a value of 200, it values that stake at 52. Thus, if it makes its
investment of one in additional information, the bank91 is one-third
                                          
89 If the bank could communicate the additional information to the tort claimants,
it would gather it. The information’s private value to the bank is ten (the product
of its one-third share of the greater value in reorganization (200 - 110) times the
likelihood of finding that the firm is in fact worth more in reorganization, one
third) while its cost is one. But note that the bank’s incentive to invest is
suboptimal, because the social value of the information is thirty (the greater value
in reorganization, ninety, times the likelihood of getting it if the investment is
made, one third).
90 This assumes the debtor prefers reorganization to liquidation, an issue discussed
in Part VI.A., infra.
91 With more than one bank, the separate bank class would face its own collective
action problem in gathering additional information, although this would be
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likely to be able to obtain an additional payment worth 15.7 (52 -
36.3); so the bank will make the investment. Separate classification
produces socially valuable information that causes the firm to be
reorganized rather than inefficiently liquidated. A similar example
(with v=90) would show that separate classification can, for
analogous reasons, prevent a firm from being inefficiently
reorganized.
However, it is not the case that the debtor will always use the
power in a socially valuable way. This follows directly from the
earlier discussion of the debtor’s incentives to gerrymander. If, for
example, v=60 the bank would gather the information, but it would
only be privately, rather than socially, beneficial because the debtor
could “bribe” the bank to accept reorganization (at the expense of the
tort claimants). With one class, tort claimants vote for
reorganization (it has an expected value of 100). With two classes, if
the bank makes its investment in additional information, it is 2/3
likely to learn that s=50. If it learns this, it will be unwilling to accept
less than its one-third share in liquidation, or 20, from a
reorganization plan. The debtor could therefore offer the bank a
return of 21 in order to gain its assent. Since the bank knows that
the firm has a value of 50, the debtor must offer the bank 42% of the
reorganized firm’s equity. This leaves only 58% of the equity for the
tort class. But because the tort class continues to estimate s=100, it
will vote for reorganization because its expected return is 58, vs. 40
in liquidation. Even though liquidation is more efficient than
reorganization, the firm will be reorganized. The bank’s investment
in information merely allows it to gain a greater share of s at the
expense of the tort claimants: the bank’s investment in information is
privately, but not socially, valuable.92
Such concerns might underlie the otherwise-puzzling practice of
requiring that each secured claim be placed in a separate class, unless
it shares the same collateral and priority level as another secured
                                                                                     
mitigated to the extent that the judge appointed a bank creditors’ committee,
§1102(a), and allowed its expenses as an administrative expense, §503(b)(3)(F).
92 The value of the investment to the bank is 2.89 (the product of the likelihood
the information will be useful, two-thirds, times the difference between the bank’s
return with the information, 21, and the bank’s return without the information
(one-third of 50)).
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claim.93 This greatly increases the number of classes, which might
increase bargaining costs. However, an offsetting benefit may be
that, because separate classification makes an individual claimant’s
vote more significant, it induces secured creditors to gather
additional information about the firm. Classification practice with
respect to secured creditors, to some degree, makes distinctions in a
manner related to creditors’ information-gathering capacity. A
secured creditor with a floating lien in the debtor’s inventory and/or
receipts is, because of pre-bankruptcy incentives and specialization,
likely to be able to gather information about the firm’s value at a
lower cost than other creditors. On the other hand, a creditor with a
security interest in the debtor’s trucks does not seem particularly
better-situated to gather information about s than a creditor secured
by the debtor’s office equipment (yet the latter two will be classified
separately).94 Even if a secured creditor is to be paid in full under a
plan, it has an incentive to gather additional information so long as it
is not paid immediately, in cash. If the secured creditor is receiving
equity in the reorganized firm, that equity’s value is of obvious
importance. So too if the creditor is receiving deferred cash
payments: the future prospects of the reorganized firm are important
to determining whether the discount factor being applied to the cash
stream is advantageously high or disadvantageously low.
That inducing the production of socially valuable information is
one of the goals behind requiring classification gains some additional
support from the Code’s waiver, for small claims, of the prohibition
against classifying dissimilar claims together.95 Small claimants are
unlikely to have much information about the debtor,96 and would
find the cost of gathering additional information high (relative to
their small potential benefit, given the small size of their claims).
                                          
93 E.g., In re Commercial Western Fin. Corp., 761 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.
1985).
94 This suggests that Canadian practice, in which secured creditors can be classified
together even if their underlying collateral differs, Triantis, supra note __, at 290,
favors the reduction in bargaining costs that occurs if the truck and office
equipment creditors are classified together, although at the risk of judicial error
resulting in the inventory creditor being classified with other secured creditors.
95 11 U.S.C. §1122(b).
96 At least in the usual case where obtaining such information had some cost.
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To summarize, the debtor’s classification power may enable it to
give creditors incentives to invest in information or share
information that they already have. The debtor could place a creditor
it thought had better access to information in its own class. This
would give it veto power and hence an incentive to gather additional
information. At the same time, classification may give creditors a
perverse incentive to invest in information that affects only intra-
creditor distribution and that does so in a manner that does not
reflect prebankruptcy entitlements.
VI. Agency Costs and Vote-Buying
A. Debtor and Managers
Earlier sections assumed an identity of interest between the
firm’s managers and its equity-holders. As the agency cost literature
shows, however, managers’ interests typically diverge from those who
have the right to the residual value of the firm.97 This problem raises
the question whether the voting rules in Chapter 11 properly deal
with managerial incentives.
Managers’ interests diverge from those of equity for several
reasons. In particular, managers rarely own all the equity of the firm.
When they own little equity, they usually receive less variable returns
than equity, such as salaries and other benefits. To the extent regular
salaries compensate the managers, they have a strong incentive to
avoid risk (relative to equity’s interest) and to keep the firm in
business even after it is no longer viable. In closely held corporations
(most Chapter 11 filings are by closely held firms98) managers
typically own considerable equity and hence are more likely to seek
to maximize its value than are managers of public corporations.
However, such managers still may prefer private benefits to increases
in equity value which must be shared with other shareholders. The
larger Chapter 11 cases, and those most likely to lead to the
confirmation of a reorganization plan,99 involve primarily large,
                                          
97 E.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
98 See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633,
637 (1993).
99 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
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publicly-held corporations. In such a firm the managers were initially
selected by the equity-holders or their representatives (the directors),
but the managers typically hold only a small portion of the firm’s
equity.
In the perfect information model without agency costs, delay
does not occur. With agency costs, managers may strategically cause
delay in order to maintain their position as long as possible. This
might explain why reorganizations of public corporations take longer
than reorganizations of closely held corporation, whose managers
usually own a substantial amount of equity.100 Also, in the perfect
information model, the distribution of value will no longer depend
on the relative bargaining power of the firm and the creditors, but
also on the manager’s outside options. A manager with more
valuable outside options can more credibly threaten departure than a
manager with fewer valuable outside options, and thus obtain greater
concessions from creditors.101
The introduction of agency costs in the imperfect information
model might increase the amount of delay in equilibrium. Some
managers will engage in delay solely to save their jobs. Even
managers who act loyally will have to delay if they control a low
value firm, because they must persuade creditors that the delay
reflects the firm’s valuation, not their independent interests.
An important normative implication of managers’ tendency to
engage in socially costly delay is that the incentive to delay may
justify violation of prebankruptcy entitlements.102 One way to
discourage managers from delaying is to give them more value in
bankruptcy than they would otherwise be entitled to. This could be
in the form of more value to the debtor to the extent that the
manager has equity, or more value to the managers directly via side
payments.
A countervailing force might arise from managers’ desires to
                                                                                     
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 600-
01 (1993).
100 In general, publicly-traded corporations are larger and more complex; this
might also explain their greater time to reorganization.
101 See Baird and Picker, supra note __, at 319.
102 See Bebchuk & Picker, unpublished manuscript.
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maintain good reputations. They might avoid delay and other forms
of strategic behavior so as to avoid bad reputation. Creditors could
do better than we concluded in preceding sections if they can induce
management to favor creditors over equity-holders by threatening
the managers with replacement if the managers did not adopt a more
pro-creditor plan.103 If the managers’ plan paid creditors in stock,
rather than with cash, management might fear replacement after the
plan is approved. Even in such a situation, however, they might
include long-term employment contracts for themselves as part of
the plan,104 or they might prefer obtaining benefits now (see below)
to retaining their jobs post-reorganization. The creditors could also
petition the court for appointment of a trustee, which would result in
the removal of at least some of the current managers, but such an
appointment is difficult to obtain n the absence of outright fraud or
incompetence by the managers.105 More important, creditors might
                                          
103 Replacing the managers would be a “threat” if the managers earn more in their
present jobs than they could elsewhere. This might be especially true in the
Chapter 11 context, since the bankruptcy of their firm would likely damage the
managers’ reputations. See Baird & Picker, supra note __, at 320 n.23, 334 n.50;
Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON.
241, 253-56 (1989) (presenting evidence that managers leaving financially
distressed firms suffer lost earnings). If the threat of being fired were not enough
to cause managers to hew to a more pro-creditor line, the creditors could simply
follow through on their threat, although this might come at some cost to creditors
if new managers would manage the firm less efficiently for a time.
104 Seemingly contemplated by 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(5). Note that long-term
contracts for incumbent managers might lower the value of the firm, as they could
be expected to increase agency costs; thus “golden handshake” agreements in
which managers received generous termination benefits might be advantageous for
both managers and creditors.
105 See, e.g., In re Aardvark, Inc., 1997 WL 129346 *3 (D.Del.) (“appointment of
a trustee is seen as an extraordinary remedy”). Courts feel that liberal appointment
of trustees would undercut Chapter 11's seeming commitment to the operation of
bankrupt firms by pre-bankruptcy management (the “debtor in possession”),
presumably based on the idea that the current management has better knowledge
of how to operate the firm.
If managers seek to divert funds from creditors to equity-holders, it would be
difficult to reconcile their removal with 11 U.S.C. §1104(a)(2), which sanctions
removal if it “is in the best interests of the creditors, any equity security holders,
and other interests of the estate” (emphasis added) rather than simply in the
interests of creditors.
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refrain from seeking the removal of managers because the
appointment of a trustee ends the exclusivity period,106 and initiates
multi-creditor bargaining with its attendant dangers of cycling and
rent-seeking.
Agency costs could also manifest themselves in the managers,
rather than simply seeking to preserve their salaries, attempting to
seize for themselves the benefits of agenda control. In such a
situation the debtor’s agenda control may harm both creditors and
equity-holders, because the managers introduce a self-interested plan
that is in the interest of neither creditors nor (non-management)
shareholders. In essence, the managers may submit a plan that offers
creditors dTv, non-management equity-holders 0, and management
s-dTv.107 Of course, such a plan awards more to management equity-
holders than to non-management equity-holders,108 but the managers
could argue that they were not similarly situated to the other equity-
holders, since they were contributing “new value” to the firm in
agreeing to continue to work for the firm during (and after) the
reorganization.
To the extent shareholders can threaten to remove managers
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the situation
would more closely resemble the analysis presented in preceding
sections, where managers act on behalf of equity-holders. During a
bankruptcy, shareholders can meet and remove the firm’s
management unless doing so constitutes a “clear abuse.”109 It might
seem surprising that shareholders would be allowed to control a
firm’s managers during bankruptcy, as they could use this power to
disadvantage creditors and benefit themselves. Yet the case law
                                          
106 11 U.S.C. §1121(c)(1).
107 See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1052 (1992).
108 In terms of prebankruptcy incentives, see supra note __, such a return would
mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by “debt overhang,” see George G.
Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L.
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positive return investments whose gains will be realized only by debtholders.
109 E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PENN. L.
REV. 669, 695 & n. 94 (1993).
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suggests that shareholders’ replacement of management in order to
improve the bargaining position of shareholders as against creditors
is not a “clear abuse.”110 There are two answers to this puzzle. The
first is that use of Chapter 11 does not require insolvency,111 so
shareholders may continue to be the residual claimants during
bankruptcy, and thus should be allowed to control the firm’s
decision-making. This would nonetheless suggest that the “clear
abuse” standard should prevent shareholders from replacing
management if the firm is in fact insolvent. While there is some
dicta in the case law suggesting this result,112 it is not a major theme
of the cases,113 and insolvency can be difficult to prove in any event,
given the difficulty of a court’s verifying the firm’s value. So the
better explanation may be that given the limited ability of creditors
to control the firm’s management, it is not clear whether shareholder
control is worse for creditors (shareholders likely tend towards
excessive risk-taking114) than is allowing the firm’s managers to
operate as principal-less agents who can arrogate the exclusivity-
                                          
110 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (“the
shareholder’s mere intention to exercise bargaining power . . .cannot without more
constitute clear abuse”); In re Allegheny International, Inc., 1988 WL 212509 at
*5 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 506 (1994).
111 11 U.S.C. §109. Instead, a firm may, for example, face cash-flow problems
and attempt to hold off foreclosure by a secured creditor. Such foreclosure might
harm unsecured creditors and/or equity-holders by interfering with the firm’s
operations.
112 In re Johns-Manville, 801 F.2d at 65 n.6.
113 E.g., Saxon Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 39 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (refusing to enjoin equity-holder’s committee from seeking to compel
shareholder’s meeting in state court, even though debtor insolvent and equity-
holders would have “no interest” under proposed reorganization plan); Saxon
Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Del. 1985) (“insolvency
alone, irrespective of degree, does not divest the stockholders of a Delaware
corporation of their right to exercise the powers of corporate democracy”).
Indeed, in Johns-Manville, the bankruptcy court, while not conducting a formal
analysis, had stated that the assertion that the debtor was solvent “fails to accept
reality,” In re Johns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985),
but the Second Circuit declined to take account of that fact on procedural
grounds, In re Johns-Manville, 801 F.2d at 65 n.6.
114 Some of which may be controllable by the court. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §363(b)(1).
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period benefits to themselves.
Even apart from the potential ability of shareholders to force
managers to act on their behalf in formulating an exclusivity-period
plan, there are limitations on how far incumbent managers can take
advantage of their control in order to appropriate s-dTv. The first is
that, in spite of the difficulty of a court’s verifying the firm’s value,
there may be practical constraints on the absolute size of the stake
that managers can allocate to themselves before a plan appears to be
plainly abusive (at least in its treatment of managers vis-a-vis other
shareholders).115 A second, and related, point, is that, in bankruptcy,
a firm’s directors and managers owe fiduciary duties to creditors as
well as to shareholders.116 Thus, to the extent any violations of such
duties are verifiable by a court, managers would be constrained by
the fear of creditor suits.
B. Claim Buying
Creditors sometimes purchase the claims of other creditors in
anticipation of bankruptcy or during bankruptcy. Because a creditor’s
voting power in the claims house depends on the size of its claim,
the creditor that purchases claims expands its voting power during
reorganization. Some judges and commentators criticize this
practice, arguing that creditors should not be permitted to “buy
votes.”117 The precise nature of their criticism, however, is unclear.
The purchase of votes in political elections is illegal, and the trading
of votes, or logrolling, in legislatures is often considered undesirable.
But the institutional context is much different in Chapter 11. This
section briefly evaluates concerns about claim buying in Chapter 11
in light of the analysis in prior sections, where claim buying was
assumed not to occur.
                                          
115 Cf. HENRY HANSMANN, THE O WNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 37 (1996)
(discussing limits to magnitude of managerial opportunism).
116 CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985). That shareholders are owed a
fiduciary duty in bankruptcy when the corporation is insolvent is somewhat
anomalous: certainly the firm’s stock has some option value, but under non-
bankruptcy law that option value would accrue to creditors if they took possession
of the firm’s assets when it became insolvent.
117 See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11,
78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992); Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1684 (1996).
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It will be helpful to begin by explaining why vote buying and
logrolling raise general concerns. Consider the following example.118
Projects
Voter A B C D
1 5 -1 5 -3
2 -1 5 -3 5
3   -1    -1    -3    -3  
TOTAL 3 3 -1 -1
The table displays the utilities that four projects (A-D) confer on
three voters (1-3). Suppose voters 1, 2, and 3 must vote separately on
whether to approve project A and project B. A project is approved if
it receives a majority of the votes. If vote trading is not possible,
neither A nor B will be approved under majority rule. If vote trading
is possible, voter 1 will vote for B in return for voter 2’s promise to
vote for A, and both projects will be approved. In this example, the
trade enhances aggregate welfare. Suppose, however, that the voters
are supposed to vote to approve project C and project D. The
projects will be approved only if vote trading is possible, but approval
of the projects this time reduces aggregate welfare. The conclusion is
that vote trading does not necessarily improve or reduce aggregate
welfare.
Claim buying in Chapter 11 is different from vote trading in this
example, because creditors actually pay money for claims, rather than
trading votes. One might believe that vote buying (as opposed to vote
trading) is desirable, because it allows voter 1 to pay $2 to voter 2 in
order to obtain majority approval of welfare-enhancing project A.
But vote buying also allows voter 1 to pay $4 to voter 2 in order to
obtain majority approval of welfare-reducing project C. In general,
vote buying under a system of majority rule enables a coalition to
form and exploit a minority. It can also lead to cycling. Note,
however, that vote buying under a system of unanimity results in the
approval only of welfare-enhancing projects.
Claim buying in Chapter 11 is also different from vote buying.
Because of the bicameral voting system, a creditor who buys a claim
                                          
118 Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A
HANDBOOK 323-24 (Dennis C. Mueller ed. 1997).
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obtains more power in the claims house than in the creditors house.
Indeed, although a creditor can relatively easily obtain veto power
through its vote in the claims house, a creditor cannot obtain the sole
power to approve or reject a plan unless it buys all outstanding
claims.
To see why, suppose that C1 and C2 each has a claim of 50, and
100 small creditors each has a claim of 1. C1 can obtain veto power
by purchasing C2’s claim or by purchasing the claims of 17 small
creditors. But even if C1 purchases the claims of C2 and 99 small
creditors, C1 still will not have the sole power to approve or reject. It
ties in the creditors house with the one remaining small creditor.
Thus, the creditors house prevents any single creditor from obtaining
the power to control the response to the debtor’s proposal unless that
creditor buys out all other creditors.
Let us now focus on the question whether, given the current
voting rules of Chapter 11, claim buying should be permitted.
Initially, it should be clear that we need a multi-party model. With a
single hypothetical creditor, no claim buying can occur. We will
focus on examples with perfect information, imperfect information
with respect to the creditor’s type, and imperfect information with
respect to optimal capital structure.
Perfect information. Suppose that two creditors Ci, i=1,2, have
claims with liquidation value vi and discount factors of di. If T<e, the
debtor’s plan will transfer di
T(vi) to each. If d1=d2, then the creditors
have no reason to buy or sell claims. But supposing, say, d1<d2, we
obtain a different result. C1 will sell its claim to C2 and C2 can
demand from the debtor a larger share than could C1 and C2 in the
aggregate.
A numerical example will clarify the argument. Let s=100,
v=100, c1=c2=100, d1=0.1, d2=0.2, T=2. Without claim buying the
payoffs for (E, C1, C2) are (70, 10, 20). If claim buying is permitted,
C2 will buy C1’s claim for some amount between 10 and 20, say, 15.
Then the debtor must give 40 to C2, and the final payoffs will be
(60, 15, 25). This result is an improvement over the regime without
claim buying, because exploitation is reduced while going concern
value is not affected.
Let us now add a third creditor, C3, with a liquidation claim
equal to c3 and a discount factor of d3, with d1<d2<d3; and assume T>e.
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Recall that if T>e, the creditors will collectively obtain some amount
greater than their share of liquidation value. In the two-party model,
the hypothetical creditor would receive an amount between de(1/2)(s-
dT-ev) and des, depending on the effectiveness of cram down. Denote
this amount as a. Assume that with three creditors, each creditor
expects, at round e, to receive a/3. Suppose that c1=c2=c3. C3 will give
C1 a sum equal to d1
e(a/3) in return for C1’s claim. Then C3 can
demand from E, at round e, d3
T-ev+a, or, at round 1, d3
Tv+dea.
Although the liquidation floor guarantees that C2 will receive d2
Tv,
C2 does not obtain its share of a. C2 will not vote against the plan,
because a vote would just cause delay and it could not obtain better
than liquidation value at a later round. This result—which assumes
that C1 and C2 can be classified separately—is a violation of
prebankruptcy entitlements. C1’s purchase of C3’s claim allows it to
exploit C2. However, this result is not necessarily worse than the
result without claim buying. Because of cycling and differing
bargaining strengths among creditors, prebankruptcy entitlements
will not usually be respected.
In sum, in the perfect information model claim-buying produces
efficiency improvements to the extent it enables creditors to
aggregate their bargaining power against the debtor. Given that the
debtor already obtains too large a portion of the surplus, an increase
in the bargaining power of the creditors is a desirable result, as it
reduces the debtor’s power to violate prebankruptcy entitlements.
And because the more patient creditor must pay the less patient
creditor for its claim, no creditor is made worse off by the availability
of claim buying. At the same time, claim buying enables one creditor
to exploit a second creditor by purchasing the claim of a third. But
there does not seem to be any reason to believe that exploitation here
is any worse than in the regime without claim buying, in which the
debtor will choose a plan that prefers some creditors to others on the
basis of their bargaining power, rather than their prebankruptcy
entitlements, or in which a dominant creditor exercises its bargaining
power after the exclusivity period expires.
Imperfect Information with Respect To Type. We noted earlier that
as the number of creditors increases beyond one, the problem of
delay becomes increasingly severe. Any creditor with veto power and
either a high discount factor or a small postbankruptcy interest has
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an incentive to delay in order to reveal its type. Supposing that half
the creditors have low valuations, a reorganization involving just one
creditor will involve delay only half the time. But a reorganization
involving ten creditors will involve delay 99.9% of the time (1-
(1/2)10), and delay will be longer if creditors take turns signaling
their type, as illustrated (for two parties) by the attrition model.
This problem raises the possibility that claim buying is desirable,
because if a single creditor purchases the claims of most or all of the
remaining creditors, fewer creditors will have an opportunity to
engage in delay. Intuitively, we expect bargaining costs—including
both delay caused by strategic behavior and the sheer time-
consuming nature of haggling with many people—to decline when
the number of bargainers declines.
The problem with this analysis is that claim buying does not
eliminate bargaining among multiple parties; it just moves it to an
earlier stage. Rather than the debtor bargaining with multiple
creditors, the creditors must bargain with each other. Each creditor
might know as little about the valuations of other creditors as the
debtor knows. Without claim buying, the signaling or screening
game takes place between the debtor and each creditor. With claim
buying, the signaling or screening game takes place between each
creditor. Low valuation creditors will hold out for higher prices,
resulting in delay.
A possible countervailing force is that each creditor might fear
that if it does not sell its claim, it will be left outside a coalition and
with little bargaining power. Thus, creditors will not engage in delay
but sell their claims eagerly. In addition, note that the most patient
creditor will buy the claims of the less patient creditors, because the
most patient creditor values the claims most and the less patient
creditors value cash more. This means that after the most patient
creditor buys up all the claims, E no longer has imperfect
information about that creditor’s type (or, at least, E’s information
about that creditor has improved: E knows that the remaining
creditor is at or near the top of the distribution). Thus, it is possible
that by revealing information about the remaining creditor, claim-
buying eliminates the signaling problem between that creditor and
the debtor, and the gain from prevention of delay offsets the cost of
haggling among the creditors.
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Imperfect Information with Respect To Optimal Capital Structure.
Suppose that C1 and C2 have identical claims and discount factors,
but that C1 has more information about the debtor than C2 does. C1
might be, for example, the debtor’s regular bank, while C2 is a tort
creditor or a sometime trade creditor. If C2 underestimates the value
of the debtor as a going concern, C2 might vote against a plan that
would net C1 and C2 more than would liquidation. If C1 merely
informs C2 that their shares would be maximized if they voted for
the plan, C2 might not believe C1, thinking that C1  has a
postbankruptcy interest that renders even an inefficient liquidation
privately advantageous to C1. But if C1 can purchase C2’s claim, C1
can ensure the plan is approved, and C2 will do no worse than if it
had voted against the plan. Thus, the availability of claim buying
may enable creditors to exploit information advantages, resulting in
maximization of going concern value. By the same token, a more
informed creditor will obtain a larger share of the surplus than a less
informed creditor will obtain, resulting in possibly greater violations
of prebankruptcy entitlements.
The reader will notice that this analysis resembles the analysis of
classification. The main difference is that the debtor uses its
classification power in order to encourage creditors to exploit their
information advantages, whereas creditors use the claim-buying
power to exploit their information advantages. In both cases, one
must balance the enhanced going concern value with the greater
danger of violation of prebankruptcy entitlements.
Summary. We have only scratched the surface of a very complex
problem. The availability of claim buying can sometimes increase
efficiency and sometimes not. Whether it will in any particular case
depends on a variety of parameters, which are probably not easily
evaluated by a judge. Yet it is impossible to say whether the
availability of the right to buy and sell claims is efficient overall. In
addition, we have not compared the existing bankruptcy regime
(with and without claim buying) to alternative regimes in which
claim buying is available. For example, it might be argued that a
unanimity rule with claim buying would be superior to the existing
regime. Future research should consider these questions.
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VII. Conclusion
Much work remains to be done before proposals for reform of
Chapter 11 can be confidently asserted. We therefore start with
some suggestions for future research, and then we draw some
tentative normative conclusions from our analysis.
Future research. The most pressing problem is that of
determining the proper way of modeling bargaining in Chapter 11.
Only further theoretical and empirical research into bargaining
problems can resolve this problem. A great deal of helpful empirical
research already exists, as we have pointed out in passing, but more
research could resolve such issues as the significance of delay and the
violation of prebankruptcy entitlements, the importance of variation
in creditors’ discount factors, the extent to which creditors have
postbankruptcy interests, the success with which courts determine
liquidation value, and so on. And our understanding of Chapter 11
will remain at only a preliminary stage until adequate formal models
of multi-party bargaining are discovered.
The optimal bargaining procedure in Chapter 11. Although our
work is too tentative to support normative proposals, we are
reasonably confident about the following propositions. Agenda
control makes sense, but it is possible that it should not be given to
the debtor, but to a trustee or a significant creditor, and that the
current exclusivity period is too short or too long. The liquidation
value floor makes sense as long as judges can estimate liquidation
value with sufficient accuracy. It is difficult to see the merits in the
current bicameral structure, but it is also difficult to understand how
it should be improved. If information pooling is important and large
creditors have greater information about the debtor, claims voting is
attractive. If strategic behavior is important and relative information
advantages among creditors are relatively small, the relative
advantages of claim and creditor voting are hard to determine. Cram
down appears to rely on overly optimistic assumptions about courts’
ability to evaluate debtors. Dictatorship (with equal treatment)
would be a surprisingly effective voting rule. But reliance on equal
treatment will interfere with plans that exploit differences in
postbankruptcy interests. Classification addresses this problem, but
only if judges are able to prevent gerrymandering, which again seems
doubtful given normal assumptions about judicial competence. The
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choice of voting rule is sensitive to one’s assumptions about the costs
of bargaining, the valuations of parties, and the importance of
information pooling. Claim-buying seems to make sense, albeit
perhaps with judicial review in order to deter abuse.
A recurring theme has been Chapter 11’s inconsistent
assumptions about judicial information. Chapter 11 assumes that the
court does not have enough information to determine s, or indeed
whether s>v, but has some information. In particular, the liquidation
floor rule assumes that the court can determine v; the absolute
priority rule assumes that the court can determine whether s>v for
non-cash plans; the equal treatment rule assumes that the court can
determine the relative value of claims; the classification rule assumes
that the court can determine which claims are “alike” and “different,”
although we suggested that this inquiry cannot be done in the
abstract and ultimately assumes that the court can determine
whether s>v under a particular plan; and so on. Many of these
assumptions appear to be inconsistent.
Alternatives to Chapter 11. More market-driven, less bargaining-
oriented corporate bankruptcy systems, such as the use of mandatory
auctions mentioned in the introduction, have three virtues, their
proponents argue. First, they straightforwardly respect
prebankruptcy entitlements. Lower-priority creditors, and holders of
equity interests, do not receive value unless higher-priority creditors
are fully paid off. Second, they reduce bargaining costs. Third, the
schemes avoid the danger of judicial error. The debtor will be valued
by a market process rather than the judge, and the judge can also
avoid approving classifications and making other substantive
determinations; he or she simply ensures that all players abide by
procedures.
Our analysis sheds light on several aspects of this debate.
Initially, the proponents of alternative schemes tend to compare their
favored (and idealized) scheme with the imperfect Chapter 11
bargaining procedure currently in place. However, as we have shown,
some aspects of Chapter 11 seem arbitrary, or require additional
analysis before they can be justified. The appropriate comparison for
those who would jettison Chapter 11 is between a practical
implementation of alternative schemes and the best version of
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Chapter 11 that could be implemented.119
Nevertheless, it does seem true that alternative systems can
respect prebankruptcy entitlements more effectively than Chapter 11
does. Any voting or bargaining system will divide the firm’s value
according to bargaining or voting power, rather than prebankruptcy
entitlements. We saw this most starkly in Part IV A, where creditors
shared the round e surplus according to bargaining power rather than
prebankruptcy entitlement. It might be argued that recent articles on
secured transactions have cast doubt on the claim that prebankruptcy
entitlements are efficient. If security interests and other contractual
priorities transfer value from tort creditors, small contract creditors,
and other nonadjusting creditors, then it may be inappropriate to
respect them in bankruptcy. Additionally, it may be necessary to
violate prebankruptcy entitlements in order to reduce agency costs.120
However, this does not justify Chapter 11’s disregard of
prebankruptcy entitlements: the auction or option approaches could
be modified to provide any desired degree of respect for
prebankruptcy entitlements,121 and presumably more systematically
than a system that relies on, for example, creditor discount factors.
The main advantage of a bargaining system compared to an
auction approach, if there is one, is flexibility. Bargaining enables
parties to agree to a reorganization when parties have substantial
non-contractible postbankruptcy interests. The auction approach
does not allow the confirmation of such plans unless parties with
postbankruptcy interests can borrow enough to purchase the firm or
can buy the claims of other parties. However, the first possibility is
not available when capital markets are imperfect, and the second
possibility requires parties to bargain with each other, with all the
attendant problems. Thus, if capital markets are imperfect, the
auction system requires parties to bargain, just like in Chapter 11.
The advantage of Chapter 11 is that bargaining is structured, and
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relies on judicial supervision. To the extent judicial expertise is
exploited properly, it can be used to mitigate delay and violation of
prebankruptcy entitlements.
The case for auctions, then, comes down to the claim that
information is sufficiently available, and capital markets sufficiently
robust, that the party with the greatest expertise can buy the
distressed firm at the highest price. If this claim is not true, then
structured bargaining might be superior to the extent that it forces
parties to reveal information while enabling them to protect their
entitlements. Whether the Chapter 11 system actually does this is a
hard question, and essentially an empirical question, but our analysis
is a step toward finding an answer.
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